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ABSTRACT

Using actual cases drawn from the field of health care ethics, my
dissertation identifies and examines the implications of a set of
common, but uncritically held presuppositions about what it means to be
a person.

Because they have been acquired without sufficient critical

reflection, these presuppositions effectively prevent us from
recognizing some crucial conditions and consequences of our unavoidable
situation as persons, i.e., that we are dynamic and interdependent
'works in progress' who, in order to persist and thrive, must maintain a
homeostatic balance in and with an equally dynamic and interdependent
environment.

The dissertation investigates what these presuppositions

are, how they come to be so readily and uncritically held and reinforced, and why their implications can have such a profound affect on
how we think and act.
My inquiry into these presuppositions and the problems they create
and perpetuate builds on the work of John Dewey, especially his views
concerning (1) ethics as the study of the interrelationships between
persons and their environments, (2) logic as the pragmatic, dynamic and
evolutionary theory of reflective inquiry and (3) democratic process as
an ethical, as well as social, ideal.

The dissertation will be

conducted with specific reference to relationships that exist between
persons in the field of health care.
ix

However, my conclusions should not

only bear directly on problems in health care, but should lead to a
better understanding of persons as bio/psycho/social entities with all
of the diverse needs and common, rational interests that such an
embodied, situated and shared existence implies.

X

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Argument Of The Study

The way we, as a community of inquirers, look at obligations and
responsibilities between persons is determined not only by the context
of the relationships between those persons, but by our presuppositions
concerning (among other things) persons, relationships, obligations and
responsibilities.

Like any other social institution, how the health

care professions perceive themselves depends upon much the same thing:
the contexts of their relationships, especially the particular social
context in which they find themselves and their particular
presuppositions concerning persons, relationships, obligations and
responsibilities.
This study is an examination of what constitutes obligation and
responsibility between patients and providers in the field of health
care.

It will examine this topic by looking at relevant sets of

presuppositions and relevant contexts.

That is, it will begin by

investigating standard notions of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence
and justice as these have been conceived in recent health care ethics
literature, and by examining the actual contexts of relationships in
this social institution as these materially affect and are, in turn,
affected by these conceptions.
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As a field that is schooled in disciplined discourse, ethics has
been instrumental in recent years in helping health care professionals
to grapple anew--and to much greater effect--with ethically problematic
cases.

It has done this by introducing ethical theory and the

philosophical tools of deliberate and systematic conceptual analysis
into the field of health care.

One of the main arguments for inviting

professionally trained philosophers and ethicists to reflect and comment
upon the relationships between patient and health care provider is the
ability of the former to provide a much needed additional perspective
for understanding the unique contexts in which these relationships
occur.
This additional perspective derives, in part, from the fact that
every person is a potential reservoir of differing or novel insights
about a problem.

But it also derives from the fact that the kind of

critical reflection practiced by ethicists and philosophers differs in
both scope and intensity from the kind of critical reflection ordinarily
engaged in by patients and health care providers.
Among other things, ethicists working in health care have been
instrumental in helping everyone involved begin to see more clearly the
complex context of each health care situation, from its physical
environment to its biological, emotional, aesthetic, religious,
political, economic and cultural aspects, and in so doing to elucidate
the interconnections between environmental/psychosocial aspects of
cases.

All of these aspects must be carefully weighed and their

ethical relevance imaginatively examined for any ethical assessment of a
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case to be considered thorough.
Though often reduced to the merely biological, the medical facts of
any given case will include--in varying degrees--any or all of the
above-mentioned aspects.

Hence, in a full articulation of any decision-

making process of each case, every one of these aspects must be taken
into consideration and carefully examined as to its relevance to the
case.

Upon surviving such scrutiny, that aspect must be included as

relevant data in the decision-making process.
From the standpoint of the ethicist, the biological aspects are
treated as 'givens' within which the remaining aspects can be examined.
And correctly so, since an ethicist's role with regard to the biological
facts of the case is, necessarily, limited to assuring that every
re,sona})1e effort has been made to determine them correctly (e.g., that
the proper specialists have been consulted and that there is enough
objective data to warrant consensus among the health care professionals
about diagnosis and prognosis), for only then can proper ethical
analysis begin.
However, from the standpoint of the health care professional, what
these biological facts actually represent is merely a distillation of
the field's best efforts to date in understanding very complex
physiological processes.

That is, they are not simple 'givens,' but in

reality are open to what are, at times, rather wholesale modifications.
In and of itself, this has never been an especially problematic matter
for health care professionals themselves; they must quickly grow used to
dealing with diagnoses, prognoses and therapies that must be established
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and instituted in the face of various degrees of ambiguity and
uncertainty.
It is important to remember, in other words, that facts, though
relatively stable for some purposes, are not permanent fixtures of
existence nor need they be.

Effective inquiry, like effective science,

need not await absolute certainty but can--and, in fact, must--rely on
the judicious use of statistical probability.

So, in regard to the

biological facts of the case, the role of the ethicist--much like that
of the patient--is necessarily relatively passive.

This is so, not

because biological facts about any given patient are utterly fixed or
other than statistical in nature, but rather because some participants
to the conversation (in this case health care providers) are more
qualified by virtue of their exposure to and deliberate cultivation of
an intensely focused set of experiences.

What the ethicist hopes for is

a similar flexibility and openness to new understanding regarding the
ethical and other contextual features of health care situations, new
understanding that will grow as the ethicist's special skills are honed
and refined through practice.
One place where these biological aspects of a case can become
especially problematic ethically is in health care providers'
communication (and lack of communication) of them, of their
consequences, and of the implications of their consequences to patients
and their stipulated significant others.

They can become problematic

because the biological facts of a case belong to a person, i.e., a
rational, sentient entity that necessarily exists within--and thus
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cannot be understood in complete isolation from--an environment.

That

is, biological facts "belong to" a person in the sense that, though they
are physiological data, their precise meaning depends upon how the
patient understands that data, viz., in terms of how this data will
affect her daily life and her understanding of herself as the primary
author, as it were, of that life.

Hence, a realistic meaning of these

biological facts in this particular situation cannot develop without the
existence of an engaged, on-going dialogue between health care providers
and patient (or designated other).
Certainly, ethicists have made a major contribution in this
problematic area by helping health care providers become more aware of
their obligation to communicate these biological facts, and to do so as
sensitively and as unambiguously as possible.

By means of this

contribution, patients are given a greater opportunity for making
intelligent, well-informed decisions about their own health care and to
maximize their participation in that care.
As for the psychological (including emotional and religious)
aspects of a case, here too, ethicists have made important contributions
to the thinking of health care providers and their patients.

That is,

they have assisted both patients and their care-givers to develop more
imagination, sensitivity and responsiveness in identifying and
understanding values--their own as well as those of others.

This has

encouraged a more active, responsible and balanced collaboration between
health care providers and patients.

Ethicists have also assisted health

care providers in developing more effective conceptual tools for
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discussing such things as, for example, what constitutes decisional
capacity in each particular patient or what presumed consent and
informed consent are, how they differ and why.
Unfortunately, a third set of aspects are often more difficult to
examine, for ethicists and for health care providers and patients alike.
These are the social aspects which include political, religious,
economic and any other cultural aspects of human existence.

While

ethicists have sometimes contributed to articulating the social aspects
in problematic cases, this move is not common because of the sets of
concepts, and the presuppositions on which they rest, that most
contemporary health care ethicists employ.

Even when made, it has

usually been by abandoning the analysis of particular, concrete cases
and by moving, instead, in the direction of sorting cases in terms of
whether they are issues of micro- or macro-allocation, and then treating
these issues as though they are entirely unconnected to and unaffected
by one another.
While this approach has led to some extremely helpful distinctions
for certain kinds of analyses, especially in areas that concern
political and economic institutions, all too often it has led to
treating large scale social structures (e.g., the various professions,
health care institutions, economic institutions and various public
associations and affiliations generally) as though the problems they
confront could be addressed in isolation from day-to-day health care
encounters instead of seeing these as particular, concrete problems that
occur within and are unavoidably connected to and shaped by the larger
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social and cultural frameworks.
This particular way of dealing with social issues in health care
has often had another unfortunate effect.

Namely, it has led many

ethicists, as well as the patients and health care providers they serve,
to treat the social aspects of particular cases as though they were
analogues of biological 'givens' in a case, to be passively accepted
rather than regarded as changeable, ethically significant and deserving
of careful attention at the same time the more local details of the
cases are being considered.

For both ethicists and health care

providers alike, the social aspects of the case can often appear to be
unalterable conditions beyond discussion instead of material
circumstances that are, in large part, also negotiable within
communities.

Since there is, as yet, little that can be modified

concerning the circumstances of our biology in comparison to what there
is, potentially, that can be modified concerning the social aspects of
our lives, the biological and the social aspects are clearly not
analogous in this respect.
This disanalogy is the reason for the dissatisfaction felt towards
a particular class of health care ethics cases by ethicists and health
care providers alike; namely, cases in which they are struggling to
articulate and to examine those alternatives available to patients and
their families or significant others, alternatives that are located at
the interface between the needs of individual patients and the values
and priorities of the community, as these are represented by specific
institutions within the community. 1

This dissertation will focus on an
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examination of cases of this sort, in which elements of social context
play such a crucial role in the ethical issues at stake but are,
nonetheless, often overlooked or assumed to be unchangeable 'givens,'
with little or no argument.
In other words, the thesis of this dissertation is that the
standard ways in which health care ethicists, health care providers and
patients have tended to discuss and to analyse ethical issues in health
care have not adequately addressed the possibility that social elements
of a situation are not beyond examination, ethical analysis and critical
reconstruction.

Ethicists and health care providers alike have been

inappropriately passive before these social aspects.

This is why there

can be little doubt that this area of concern would profit from even
greater input from ethics as a discipline.
My project will construct, test and defend an alternative to the
approaches typically taken in the ethical analyses of such cases.

I

will provide some cases that are representative of this problem and,
examining these cases carefully, I will first show how the approaches
that I am critizing address them, and then explain not only what these
approaches miss but, more importantly, why they miss it.

I will

demonstrate that these approaches typically involve presuppositions
about persons, relationships, obligations and responsibilities that
leave them unable to take adequate account of the social/contextual
factors of a case.

Their inability to inform us adequately about such

cases, I will argue, is grounded in these defective presuppositions.

In

defending this view, I will, in other words, be challenging some rather
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basic assumptions commonly made in contemporary health care ethics
concerning persons, the nature of their relatedness and the meaning of
what is often called the integrity and autonomy of persons.
For the sake of having a convenient name for the forms of ethical
analysis that I will be criticizing here, I will refer to them
collectively as 'the standard approach.'

The sets of concepts and modes

of ethical analysis that I intend by this phrase will be illustrated in
detail in chapter two.

There I will show how 'the standard approach'

deals with problematic cases in such as way as to highlight this
approach's defects.

In calling this 'the standard approach' I am not,

of course, claiming that all contemporary health care ethicists practice
it or that ethicists who employ other such concepts, presuppositions and
modes of inquiry to issues in health care are automatically therefore
considered inept.

But by a significant margin, the approach that I am

calling 'the standard approach' is the most common way in which issues
are discussed in the health care ethics literature and have been
discussed for nearly two decades.
Hence, the appellation, 'standard approach,' is well deserved.

The

fact that it is so typical is not, however, the problem that concerns
this dissertation, since it is written from a perspective that is
philosophical rather than sociological.

The problem to be addressed

here is that this pattern of inquiry is seriously defective.

It is

built on presuppositions that leave it essentially blind, and therefore
passive, to the impact of ethically important contextual (e.g., social)
features of health care situations.

This is what I shall demonstrate
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here.
A Rationale That Is Not Limited To Health Care

While I will be looking specifically at problematic relationships
between persons in the setting of health care, the basic assumptions
that I challenge are certainly more fundamental insofar as they form the
basis of how we often think about persons and the nature of human
interaction in general.

My investigation will show how these

assumptions affect other related background assumptions, shaping
attitudes and conduct towards a set of concepts about persons that
includes (though it is not necessarily limited to) autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.
There are a number of good reasons why someone interested in
sorting out various presuppositions about persons and their
connectedness would benefit from analysing the relationship between
providers and recipients of health care.
hardly novel.

Of course, such a move is

Plato, for example, thought that one of the best ways to

get clear about the 'soul' is to look at the actual relationship of
citizens to the polis which he treated as an inquiry into the 'health'
of the soul.

But there are other, more important reasons for using the

health care context to raise questions about common presuppositions
about relationships, obligations and responsibilities.
First, there is a distinctive combination of intimacy and distance
characteristic of relationships between providers and recipients of
health care.

For this reason, health care provides a richer context for

studying relationships than settings in which only one or other of these
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characteristics are evident.

In other words, because health care

relationships share aspects of both the intimacy evident in personal
relationships and the detachment characteristic of impersonal
relationships, at least as they are currently understood in our culture,
they seem to be an exceptionally good place to focus a study of common
presuppositions about relationships.
Second, there is already an ongoing discussion among philosophers
interested in health care about the appropriate model(s) of relationship
health care should aspire to or adopt.

Working in this area will

provide an important 'head start,' since this study will be able to add
to our understanding without having to initiate the inquiry de nova.
Third, my own past experience as a health care provider
(specifically as a nurse with more than fifteen years of experience from
geriatrics to intensive care) can bring to such a project a familiarity
with aspects of the health care setting that will help to focus the
examination of these presuppositions on concrete, real life aspects of
relationship and social context.

An important risk of a foundational

study of presuppositions and context in ethical reflection lies in its
becoming too abstract and, thus, too difficult to translate back to the
ordinary details of life.

By focusing this philosophic inquiry on the

health care setting, I hope to keep its reflections more concrete,
precise and, therefore, accessible.
Finally, for Dewey, whose philosophical work has guided much of my
method in this study, the test of any philosophical theory is whether it
actually helps in the resolution of a pressing problem.

Should the
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results of my inquiry help to clarify some aspects of the knotty
problems in health care associated with the bio/psycho/social dynamics
of persons then, according to Dewey, the project would be demonstrated
to be of real value.
Methodology

This project utilizes an alternative methodology based on the
critical and experimental attutide of reflective inquiry advocated by
John Dewey. 2

That is, the methodology is critical, empirical,

experimental, pragmatic, naturalistic, pluralistic and nonreductionistic.

While Dewey's contributions to this project will be

explained more fully in chapter three, each of these terms deserves, for
the moment, a brief explanation.

The method of this project is critical

in the sense that all reflection (including philosophic reflection) is
treated as a scientific critique of ''causal antecedents and causative
consequents." 3

It is empirical and experimental in the sense that,

instead of attempting to posit some hypothetical account of human nature
as an heuristic device, it begins with lived experience which it then
subjects to a systematic accumulation of evidence through the deliberate
modification, transformation and reconstruction of the antecedent
material of that experience. 4
The method of this project is pragmatic in the sense that
experience is treated as an ongoing series of interactions--what Dewey
called "a matter of simultaneous doings and sufferings"--between each
living being and its physical and social environment. 5

Consequences

function as tests of the validity of the results of critical reflection
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on these interactions--with the proviso that these consequences are
operationally instituted. 6 Thus, reflective inquiry is characterized as
an inherently public, social activity, an activity that is curnmulative
and evolving, an activity that has distinctive survival value for its
practitioners, both individually and collectively.
The method of this project is naturalistic in the following senses:
(1) it holds that there is a common logical pattern of knowing in
science and morals;, 7 (2) it rejects the belief that experience is some
mysterious thing external, but somehow attached, to a living being; 8 and
(3) it treats experience as a complex, evolving field within which each
living being is a dynamic, interactive component within an equally
dynamic, interactive environment. 9 , lO

That is, such a methodology

targets, critically analyses and suggests a way of reconstructing
presuppositions that ignore an unalterable aspect of the actual
situatedness of persons: namely, that persons are fragile, responsive
'works in progress'--simultaneously products and agents who, in order to
preserve their integrity as persons, must maintain a dynamic homeostatic
balance within an equally fragile and responsive environment.
Finally, the method of this project is pluralistic and, therefore,
non-reductionistic in the sense that, because persons are
bio/psycho/social entities, what characterizes them as persons cannot be
reduced to any one of these aspects alone--as, for example, the
biological aspect of 'being alive.'

Rather, persons are said to 'have

lives,' which requires attention to the entire bio/psycho/social field
of their existences. 11

Because the experience of persons is an
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unavoidably bio/psycho/social phenomenon, efforts to increase our
understanding of that phenomenon should be pursued in bio/psycho/social
terms; i.e., what counts as inquiry, evidence and explanation cannot
ignore and will be integrally tied to learning how the bio/psycho/social
aspects of experiences dynamically interreact.

According to this view,

all concepts central to persons will be unavoidably and irreducibly
bio/psycho/social.
So, in general, how to proceed?

The project borrows, at every

level of inquiry, a stratagem favored by Plato's Socrates.

Plato

initiated a number of his dialogues with Socrates hailing a friend or
group of acquaintances by way of two questions: "Where have you come
from?" and "Where are you going? 1112
merely geographical.

These queries pointed beyond the

They served as foils for the purpose of

introducing the personalities of the interlocutors and establishing the
precise context and development of a problematic issue--everything
relevant from the brute, physical features to more abstract,
intellectual ones.

A dialogue then ensued about the meaning of that

problematic issue, wherein a variety of alternatives were solicited and
offered--sometimes timidly, sometimes brashly, often enthusiastically,
but always in a surprisingly democratic spirit--in answer to a third,
usually unarticulated question: "How do we get there?"
These three questions are basic, time-honored questions that
structure virtually all intelligible and intelligent inquiry into the
most abstract, theoretical, practical and/or mundane of situations or
issues. 13

Such inquiry, when controlled, can transform experiences that
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are indeterminate into experiences that are, to paraphrase Dewey, funded
with meaning.
The first question, "Where have you come from?" establishes the
historical context of the inquiry--the past physical environment,
biological parameters and psychosocial elements that enter into a
situation or issue--in order that its presuppositions may be revealed
and assessed.

The second question, "Where are you going?" investigates

the 'destination' or future of an inquiry, its meaning, its various
aims, its possible consequences and the intentions, presuppositions and
commitments of those initiating and benefitting from it.

The third

question, "How do we get there?" prompts the marshalling of various
plans of action, the means by which tentative responses to the second
question might be approximated and tested.
Each of these three questions must be asked and answered
sequentially in any controlled inquiry.

Moreover, a lack of answers or

paucity of solutions to the third question may necessitate a
renegotiation of either what constitutes an acceptable answer to the
second or, sometimes, even a reassessment of the first.

While such to-

and-fro assessments and re-evaluations serve to hone the inquiry by
clarifying its meaning and the various available options and their
consequences, they do not change the basic structure of this pattern of
inquiry.

By maintaining this pattern, the goals and expectations of the

inquiry are kept realistic and appropriate.

Indeed, any intelligent

inquiry, whether the subject matter is science or morals, must ask and
answer these three basic questions in one way or another.
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The characteristics of reflective inquiry that are embodied by
these three questions are, in fact, the basis for Dewey's claim that,
for critical, reflective thought to succeed, it must rely on the method
of science. 14

For Dewey believed that the actual method of scientific

inquiry is the best example we have yet developed of intelligence at
work.

This method is not the same as the pseudoscience that passes for

so much of what is popularly considered scientific thought--a narrow,
technical view of science in which changeless laws are uttered,
memorized and externally applied.

Rather, the method espoused here is

the same continuous, progressive, democratic and collaborative process
(including its painstakingly controlled and monitored antecedents and
consequents) that occurs in laboratories, field work, and wherever
communities of researchers wholeheartedly and cooperatively work
together, imaginatively anticipating and offering alternative
resolutions to actual problems of living.
Summary Of Remaining Chapters

In chapter two a number of select cases are presented in order to
provide a careful analysis of how ethical issues in health care are
standardly conceived and discussed today.

In the course of this

presentation, certain inadequacies in the standard approach become
evident and prompt the following question: why is it that so much is
overlooked in how the issues are conceived and discussed?

It is

proposed that these inadequacies occur because the standard approach in
question relies on moral theories that are themselves based on
presuppositions that are open to serious question; and it is suggested
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that this difficulty can be addressed with the help of John Dewey.
Chapter three is devoted to an examination of the key elements that
this dissertation shares with John Dewey's pragmatic and naturalistic
methodological approach.

The purpose of such an examination is to help

make explicit some of this dissertation's central assumptions and to
provide cogent reasons in their defense.
experience is reviewed.

To that end, Dewey's theory of

Next, a detailed analysis of his account of

reflective inquiry is undertaken in order to clarify much of the
approach and some of the substantive claims developed later in this
work.
In particular, Dewey understood reflective inquiry to be the method
of intelligence, and described it as a complex, evolutionary and
inherently public social activity that has distinctive survival value
for its individual practitioners.

For Dewey the capacity to engage in

such reflective inquiry is what characterizes us as beings capable of
understanding the nature of our relationships with the rest of the
world, including the importance of social contexts and how these affect
and are affected by how we perceive ourselves as persons.
Also addressed in chapter three is Dewey's view of science as a
paradigm for the method of critical inquiry.

He reminds us that

reflective inquiry is something that is done and not simply thought.
Moreover, the melioristic character of reflective inquiry that follows
from treating intelligence as a process that is both perspectival
(individual) and falsifiable (public) is noted.

By enhancing our

ability to control how we progress both as individuals and as
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participants in a community, reflective inquiry is the process by which
we come to understand obligations and responsibilities and, thus, to
recognize our uniqueness as ethical beings.
In chapter four, certain key presuppositions of the ethical
theories on which the standard approach to health care ethics rests are
examined.

These key presuppositions are central to the way personhood

is standardly conceived, especially a much vaunted notion of autonomy as
an isolated, atomistic locus of rational self-determination and selfsufficiency are challenged.

These presuppositions are analysed,

criticized, reconstructed and carefully qualified in Deweyian terms.

As

part of this process, the following material conditions of persons are
examined: (1) that throughout their lives persons experience basic
needs 15 which, when unmet, cause them to suffer and (2) that persons,
whether they consciously appreciate their situation or not, depend on
others for the prevention or amelioration of some portion of their own
suffering.
These material conditions strongly suggest that a person's
experience is shaped by interdependence.

By virtue of the fact that it

permeates the very existence--if not the conscious experience--of all
persons, interdependence is thus construed to be a standard
characteristic of personhood.

Therefore, we are justified in viewing

persons as bio/psycho/social beings from our first efforts to understand
them.
Moreover, if interdependence is thus considered a significant
characteristic and not simply a defect of persons, then it should also
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be considered a significant factor in determining what constitutes
persons as autonomous agents.

This conclusion, however, runs counter to

the prevailing assumptions about personhood in the ethical theories
which underpin the current health care ethics approach.

The prevalent

view has been to set autonomy simply in opposition to heteronomy, thus
effectively minimizing or ignoring the consequences and implications of
the fundamentally interdependent existence of persons.

In other words,

if interdependence is a central feature of personhood, then these
ethical theories must have something more to say about its role in human
agency, responsibility and obligation.

The antecedents and consequents

of interdependence, including the influence that suffering from unmet
basic needs has on the development of our understanding of what ethical
obligation amounts to, will be taken more seriously here and hence, a
more viable starting point from which to understand these ethical
relationships between persons will be made available.
In chapter five the cases analysed in chapter two by the standard
approach used in health care ethics today are re-examined from the
Deweyian perspective articulated in chapters three and four.

This will

serve to illustrate what a bio/psycho/social understanding of ethical
obligation amounts to and how it operates.

An analysis of these case

analyses is then undertaken in turn in order to identify and then test
and assess the methodological approach proposed, employed in and
defended by this dissertation.
In the concluding section of chapter five, the bio/psycho/social
interpretation of personhood developed in this work is compared to the

20

static and atomistic rendering of personhood that characterizes the
standard approach.

This comparison reveals that a bio/psycho/social

approach, because it is more sensitive to the delicate homeostatic
mechanisms that preserve the integrity of persons in their relationships
with their environment, offers a more flexible means for resolving
specific problematic situations and should therefore be adopted as the
most productive approach presently available to us for health care
ethics; that is, for applying the full powers of human intelligence to
the ethical issues that aris~ in health care.

Endnotes
1John Dewey would identify this dissatisfaction as the first step,
however inchoate, in the progression common to all inquiry: the
perception of an indeterminate 'hitch' in the flow of experience. This
hitch becomes more determinate--i.e., it takes on more clarity and
definition--during the process of inquiry. See LW 12:108-11 in the
chapter entitled, "The Pattern of Inquiry."

2For Dewey's most comprehensive treatment of reflective inquiry,
see his 1938 work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, LW 12. Alternatively,
one can get a sense of what Dewey was up to from a careful reading of
his article, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality"
which, though written in 1903, was included with only minor rev1s1ons in
a 1946 collection of essays entitled, Problems of Men, (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 211-49.) See MW 3:3-39.
3 For Dewey, the moment we begin thinking about and discussing

immediate experience, it is the means-consequence relationship that is
being considered. That is, we evaluate immediate experience in terms of
its relationships--the conditions that mediate it and the things that
it, in turn, mediates. LW 1:297; 301-2.
4LW 14:14-25.
5MW 10:6-9.
6Lw 12:4.
7Lw 14:62. Like Dewey, I wish to avoid what he criticized as
"knowing in the orthodox sense," by which he meant an accommodation of
self and its beliefs to conditions already fixed.
8 LW 14:17.
9 Lw 16:108-9.

lOA brief explanation is in order here concerning my use of the
term, "interactive." Dewey ascribed very precise functions to the
terms, "self-action," "inter-action" and "trans-action." According to
his notion of self-action, "things are viewed as acting under their own
powers.'' Inter-action is the term Dewey used to describe a relationship
"where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection." My
use of interaction is actually closest to Dewey's use of trans-action:
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where systems of description and naming [as opposed to "things" or
"entities"] are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action,
without final attribution to "elements" or other presumptively
detachable or independent "entities," "essences," or "realities,"
and without isolation of presumptively detachable "relations" from
such detachable "elements." (LW 16:101-4)
I choose to avoid the term, 'transaction,' itself however, because of
its prominent association today with exchange relationships in the
marketplace. This current association fails to capture the
transformative, evolutionary characteristics of the relationships that
Dewey intended to convey by using the term, 'transaction.' In order to
avoid this unintended association, I use either of two terms-'interaction' and 'interreaction'--to convey Dewey's sense of the term,
'transaction. '
11 The distinction I draw between 'being alive' and 'having a life'
will be explained in the section entitled Zoe and Bios in chapter four.
12 The most explicit example is the first lines uttered by Socrates
in the "Phaedrus," but these three questions are asked or answered by
Socrates in other dialogues including "Euthyphro," "Ion," "Theaetetus,"
and more obliquely in the "Protagoras" and "Timaeus."
13 This strategy has been adapted, refined, used and taught as a
method of ethics consultation and medical case presentation for at least
ten years now by Erich Loewy in his health care ethics programs. With
his permission I have drawn liberally from his experiences and expertise
in my description of this methodology.
14 MW 6:69ff, 177ff; MW 12:172ff.
15 Much has been written in ethics literature concerning what
constitutes a basic need. It is beyond the scope of this work to argue
for a particular view. For the purposes of the work, I will simply
assume basic needs to be those needs necessary (1) to maintain
biological existence (what I describe in chapter four as 'zoe,' or
'being alive') and (2) to provide the possibility for pursuing and
developing a biographical existence (what I describe in chapter four as
'bios,' or 'having a life.')

CHAPTER TWO
CASE PRESENTATIONS AND STANDARD ANALYSES
Introduction

The following cases will be examined via a format of analysis that
is considered standard in both the literature and practice of health
care ethics today.

It follows the format described in chapter one: the

biological and pathophysiological aspects of the case will be examined,
followed by the psychological, and then the social aspects of the case.
While investigating these aspects and how the various participants in
the case understand and value their implications, the central
conflicting issues of the case and the benefits and drawbacks of the
alternative courses of action for resolving them will be identified and
discussed.
In a standard case analysis, a course of action is then chosen to
resolve these conflicts.

The ideals, goals, characteristics and values

that this course of action is thought to preserve or promote are
expressed in principles that, in turn, are offered to explain and/or to
justify the preferred decision or course of action.

Among the main

principles standardly invoked in health care ethics today are autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.

The best known source for

this standard approach and the four principles it utilizes is Beauchamp
and Childress' Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 1
23

It is the approach
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that has dominated the Georgetown summer workshops that have introduced
so many participants to discussion of issues in health care ethics.
The approach to health care ethics that these four principles are
here used to typify has many other sources and representations in the
contemporary practice of health care ethics.

Though widely advocated,

this approach has a number of critics; however, few of them challenge
the presuppositions of the approach in the manner to be proposed here.
Still, the widespread currency of this approach is common knowledge
within the field of health care ethics, which is why its presuppositions
are deserving of the careful examination offered here.
Using this standard approach, three cases will be analysed in this
chapter with a view towards examining the merits, and especially the
demerits, of this approach.

In chapter five, these cases will be re-

examined in order to explain how the corrected presuppositions about
persons and their bio/psycho/social interdependence that are developed
in the intervening chapters significantly alter our understanding of
both (a) the nature and scope of the obligations between patients and
health care providers in the three cases and (b) the principles and
goals of health care practice that inform these obligations.
Before turning to the case analyses, these four principles, as they
are standardly conceived, need a brief introduction.

Obviously, because

volumes have been--and will continue to be--written about each of these
principles and the often times conflicting values they embody, this
brief introduction makes no pretensions of giving a comprehensive
picture of any one of these notions--such a picture would, in itself,
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require more attention than could feasibly be given it within this
dissertation.

That these principles continue to be so widely discussed

and debated can only lend support to my contention that the way they are
currently conceived and used can actually hamper, rather than enhance,
the controlled inquiry needed for there to be well-crafted resolutions
to problematic situations.
Four Principles Standardly Invoked in Health Care Ethics
Beneficence and Non-maleficence

The Hippocratic oath, a pledge still taken by many upon entrance
into the field of medicine, is symbolic of the important role that the
ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence play in
contemporary western culture.

These principles have been given

extensive treatment in classic texts dealing with the philosophical
bases of health care ethics. 2- 5 A famous injunction derived from that
oath--strive to help, but above all, do no harm--influences the
professional practice of all health care providers today precisely
because it confronts the ambiguous character of expertise and its
consequences: the greater the power to help, the greater the possibility
to do harm.
The last part of that injunction--above all, do no harm--is the
basis of the principle of non-maleficence.

The injunction serves as a

reminder that actions always have consequences and that agents are
largely responsible for the consequences of their actions even when
those consequences extend beyond the agents' intentions or expectations.
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The first part of that injunction--strive to help--forms the basis
of the principle of beneficence.

By means of their special expertise,

health care providers strive to help their patients.

Of course, this

'help' can take many forms, from disinterested offering of advice to
actual appropriation of decision-making responsibilities for a patient.
A significant part of the ongoing dialogue about beneficence in the
health care literature is an attempt to determine how to distinguish
clearly between actions that are beneficent and those that are not by
addressing the issue of what constitutes helping patients--and by whose
definition.
Justice
While the principle of justice has been conceived from a number of
conflicting perspectives, 6

these various conceptions do have certain

features in common: (a) that justice is obligatory and not simply
optional and (b) that justice is concerned with giving persons what is
their due.

Of course, what is in dispute between these conflicting

conceptions of justice is how to determine (a) what constitutes
'obligation' and (b) what constitutes 'due.'

However, any discussion of

'obligation' or 'due,' in turn, rides piggy-back on a determination of
what constitutes 'persons' and what it is that makes them autonomous
which, because it is also a matter of dispute, hardly provides more
clarity to the issue.
In a great majority of health care ethics cases analysed today, the
way in which the notion of justice is customarily perceived--as my
sample cases are intended to show--begins by isolating the individual or
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individuals involved.

That is, it emphasizes a view of persons as

isolated and self-contained.

This, in turn, significantly affects the

way in which the scope of the notions of obligation and due are
interpreted.
Autonomy

The last--but hardly least--principle to be examined is that of
autonomy, which requires that persons be respected and which is
intimately connected to the notions of liberty and self-determination.
The principle of autonomy finds its classic expression in the version of
Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative wherein persons are required to
treat each other never merely as means, but always at the same time as
ends in themselves. 7 Because it underwrites an important, albeit
imprecise, set of characteristics thought to be central to persons, the
principle of autonomy has been invoked both to defend and to condemn all
sorts of interactions between persons.
Take, for example, the issue of paternalism--i.e., treating
patients without their informed and willing consent and justifying such
treatment on the basis of a professional obligation to benefit one's
patients--which continues to loom so large as an issue in health care
practice.

The principle of autonomy has been invoked both in criticism

against and in defense of paternalism.
On the one side, it has acted as a counterbalance to a belief still
shared by many health care providers: namely, the belief that their
special expertise makes them more qualified to determine what is in the
best interests of patients than patients themselves.

Opponents of this
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belief use the principle of autonomy to argue that persons must be
presumed to be capable of making their own decisions.

Some of them even

argue that the only obligation experts have is to make available their
expertise, which persons might then freely ignore, heed or disregard.
On the other side, the principle of autonomy has been appropriated
to mount one of the strongest defenses for paternalism: a justification
of paternalistic actions based on the claim that such actions constitute
the only means available for preserving or re-establishing a patient's
autonomy.

Invoking the principle of autonomy, these thinkers argue that

special expertise not merely permits but, under certain conditions,
obligates experts to engage in paternalistic practices.
As can be seen by this brief introductory discussion, the same
principle can be, and often is, invoked in support of opposing sides of
an issue.

This suggests that it is not these ethical principles

themselves that are so central to the decision-making process.

Instead,

it suggests that there is something else behind these ethical principles
(viz., ethical intuitions) which, when left unexamined, will influence
the direction and outcome of that process in ways that cannot be
anticipated.
Certainly, without unexamined ethical intuitions of some sort, the
decision-making process could never get off the ground.

But, unless our

unexamined ethical intuitions undergo the same careful scrutiny to which
the rest of the process is subjected, there is no way to understand or
to assess the role they play or, more importantly, their influence over
us.

The case analyses presented in this chapter illustrate how an over-
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reliance on ethical principles can actually hinder discovery of and
reflective inquiry into the role that these important ethical intuitions
play in decision-making.
A Brief Look at the Role Ethical Principles Play in Case Resolution

In order to clarify how ethical principles are used and what aspect
of them is emphasized in standard case analyses, a representative
description of such principles will be examined.

The one provided here

is offered by Glen C. Graber and David C. Thomasma in Theory and
Practice in Medical Ethics:
Moral principles express fundamental theoretical norms ... A moral
principle is an ought-statement which may express (or yield) a
command about (imperative), a precept towards (prescriptiveJ, or a
description of (descriptive) conduct to be done or avoided.
This definition implies, among other things, the idea that
principles, like rules, are 'summary,' insofar as they are useful in
summarizing antecedent cultural behaviors and practices and their
outcomes.

That is to say, they are useful, shorthand formulations that

convey how problems presently faced have been addressed successfully in
the past.

Such a summary description of principles easily lends itself

to support a kind of formalistic interpretation of principles, values,
rules or theories consistent with an applications model of problemsolving, i.e., a predominantly top-down strategy that applies concepts
to specific issues or particular cases.

This formalistic interpretation

is presupposed in much problem-solving that occurs in the field of
health care ethics today, irrespective of whether the actual theory
behind the activity of problem-solving is predominantly deductivist,
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dialectical, principlist, casuistical or situationalist. 9
One of the weaknesses of the applications model is that it can too
easily lull the problem-solver into thinking of the disposition of a
case as 'solved' rather than 'resolved,' two words that can be used to
capture an important distinction.
principles

That is, the application of

to 'solve' a case can suggest a discrete and circumscribed

activity comparable to, and often defined in terms of, an externally
imposed intervention that has a fairly clearly demarcated beginning and
end.

Such a portrayal of problem-solving can encourage closure of such

finality or definitiveness that the further consequences that inevitably
flow from a case and its disposition are all but ignored.
However, to 'resolve' a case carries with it connotations of
progressive, mutual re-adjustment.

That is, it is a 'resolution' in the

sense that it is a developmental reworking through a problematic
situation by carefully attending to its discrete context and its
possible solutions, while maintaining an openness to the inevitable and
ongoing ramifications of the solutions' consequences in light of these
mutual re-adjustments and the internal dynamics of the situation itself.
Such problem-solving by resolution describes Dewey's activity of making
an indeterminate situation more determinate. 10
In contrast to the top-down strategy of the applications approach
that will be used to solve the cases in this chapter, resolution (as it
has been outlined here and will be utilized in the reconstructed cases
in chapter five) requires, at minimum, openness to the reciprocal
interreaction between principles as tentative guides (not stipulations)
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and the rest of the experiential context of a problematic case.

That

is, rather than finding a solution via a systematic execution of a
predetermined principle or algorithm, resolution necessitates openness
to the experiential context of a problematic situation, attention to the
variety of possibilities that principles can represent and
acknowledgment of the effect that the particular development of a case
resolution has on future practice and behavior, both individual and
institutional.
A standard objection against an applications model runs as follows:
since no rule, principle or theory has ever been shown to be adequate or
complete, there is no independent mechanism to be 'applied,' and thus,
no solutions to practical issues can be deduced.

The objection offered

in this dissertation is more fundamental: it denies the possibility of
an independent mechanism that can be 'applied' by denying the
presumption that either 'things' (be they material or conceptual) or
their meanings can have free-standing or isolated existences.
'thing' exists in a vacuum, neither can its meaningfulness.

Since no
That is,

things that exist (whether that existence is material or conceptual),
exist only within a bio/psycho/social context.

This bio/psycho/social

context provides the setting within which an implicit meaning of a thing
is represented by the way it functions within that context. 11

As such,

things are necessarily interconnected bio/psycho/social phenomena.
Prime examples of complex material and/or conceptual 'things,' are
means and ends-in-view: they are always context-dependent.

Because they

are generated in particular, distinctive situations by individuals who
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are particular and distinctive members of a shared bio-social context,
what is treated as an end-in-view in one situation (or even in different
aspects of the same situation) actually functions as a means to some
other end-in-view in another situation (or different aspect of the same
situation): their meanings depend on context.
Therefore, descriptions such as Thomasma and Graber's do not
address merely the summary aspect of principles, but their practical
aspect as well.

Once this practical aspect of principles is taken into

account, the top-down strategy of the 'applications' model is eclipsed
by the requirement that principles, like rules and theories, must be
tested for their adequacy by their actual or hypothetically anticipated
practical implications (i.e., by their future consequents) and not the
other way around (i.e., by their antecedent conditions alone--which, of
course, includes consequences, but these are the consequences of past
experience).

However, this is best understood in the course of actual

case analysis, and it is to this activity that we must now turn.
Case Analyses
Case #1: The 'Rescue Medicine' Conundrum

During a recent cold winter an indigent, elderly man was
brought into a local emergency room with pneumonia. He was
close to starvation and suffered from hypothermia because he
could not afford to eat or heat his room after paying his
rent. While in the emergency room, the man suffered a cardiac
arrest and was stabilized after aggressive cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation. But, after three weeks, he remained completely
unresponsive and totally dependent on a ventilator. During
this time social services discovered that the man had no
family or friends. The health care team suspected that the
patient would remain permanently comatose, and a neurological
consult confirmed the team's suspicion that the patient's
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prognosis was bleak.
An ethicist was consulted to discuss whether it was
ethically appropriate to discontinue this man's treatment and
was told by the health care team that between $100,000 and
$200,000 had been expended treating this man. The members of
the health care team concurred that, had it been possible to
restore the patient to a semblance of his pre-hospitalization
condition (which it was not), they would have felt no qualms
about continuing such treatment--which would have, in effect,
returned this patient to the material conditions responsible
for his hospitalization in the first place. 11
Analysis

The biological facts of this case are fairly straightforward, and
had the neurological status of the patient been unclear, prognosis could
have been further corroborated by blood flow studies of the brain.
These studies can, because of their high degree of accuracy, help to
classify patients into three rather clearly defined categories: braindead, permanently comatose and persistently vegetative.

A patient is

classified as brain-dead when no blood flow to the brain can be
visualized.

(In all fifty states, brain death is considered the legal

equivalent of the death of the person.

This makes it legally acceptable

to withdraw life support without fear of being charged with patient
abandonment or homicide.)
A patient becomes a candidate for inclusion under the second
category when there is blood flow to the brain but, after being
stabilized, the patient remains completely unresponsive even to deep,
painful stimuli.

The person to whom this has occurred is most likely,

after three weeks, permanently comatose.

Patients falling into the

third category exhibit what appear to be episodes of waking and sleeping
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but otherwise remain unresponsive.

In this condition, there is blood

flow to the brain but either it is insufficient or it has, at some
point, been interrupted long enough to cause severe damage to or
destruction of those areas of the brain associated with the 'higher,' or
cognitive functions so characteristic of persons.

Patients such as

these, after being stabilized, will remain in what is called a
persistent or permanently vegetative state.

So long as individuals can

be stabilized on life support--i.e., so long as oxygenated blood can be
circulated to the cells of the body--their vegetative functions (i.e.,
those involuntary functions of glands and organs that are controlled by
the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems) can be artificially
assisted indefinitely.
There are psychological facts about this case that are troubling.
It is known only that this patient is--and will remain--unable to speak
for himself, that he has no family or friends and that he has been
living in extreme poverty.

Social services have researched his case for

any further data that might be helpful, but have been unable to learn
any information that might prove helpful in piecing together the man's
history.

Thus there is no concrete idea of what his wishes might have

been concerning continuation or withdrawal of life-extending treatment
under these circumstances.

In effect, this patient's previous isolation

and poverty, along with his present condition of health and current
inability to communicate, to judge or to make choices have made it a
practical impossibility to anticipate how he would have chosen for
himself regarding this situation.
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The social aspects of this case are, by standard analysis, fairly
straightforward.

Because health care is such an important culturally

shared value, health care providers are committed by their respective
professional codes of ethics to treat each patient under their care with
respect.

This commitment to patients has long been reflected in formal

statements about the primary goals and values of health care providers,
which have traditionally included:
1.

curing whenever possible

2.

relieving pain and alleviating symptoms

3.

maintaining/improving function and minimizing loss of function

4.

avoiding gratuitous harm and unnecessary risk

These goals have been listed here in what has conventionally, at least
in the United States, been considered their usual order of importance.
All health care professionals today are deeply committed to some version
of these primary goals of health care for their patients.

The items may

differ in number, emphasis or ranking, depending on a variety of
considerations that include: (1) the particular health care profession
studied, (2) the particular health care provider's own hierarchy of
values and (3) the exigencies peculiar to the particular case at hand.
Still, the obligations of care-givers to patients and the principles
that express those obligations are ordinarily construed in terms of
concerns such as these.
Unfortunately, the first two of these goals are precluded by this
man's pathophysiology.

That is, neither a cure nor an alleviation of

symptoms is possible and, since the patient is not conscious, he cannot
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have pain.

The third goal is precluded except for minimizing loss of

function; but, since this man's only functions are vegetative, it is
debatable whether the language of goals and values can continue to
convey anything more than a symbolic connection with this patient's
situation.

Lastly, what is supposed to count as 'harm' and 'risk' to

patients in vegetative states is even less clear.
Since little has been gleaned from the above-mentioned goals and
values that ordinarily assist health care teams in determining how to
care for their patients, a proponent of an 'applications' approach would
counsel the health care team to appeal directly to the ethical
principles informing these goals and values, i.e., autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.

Because the patient is

indigent, he will be afforded, at least in principle, all of the same
treatment alternatives that federal, state and local support makes
available to any indigent patient within the community.

Therefore,

under a standard analysis of an individual case such as this, the health
care team's concerns about justice are ordinarily limited to assuring
that similar cases be treated similarly, i.e., that all of the social
support mechanisms customarily available to patients in similar
circumstances have been solicited and utilized.
This patient's persistent vegetative state renders him incapable of
making his own treatment decisions.

Because this patient has left no

advance directives of any sort, the health care team has no way of
ascertaining how he would now wish to be treated.

Since the patient is

incapable of either direct or indirect self-determination, the relevance
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of the principle of autonomy to this particular case is limited to
mandating that respect for this patient obligates the health care team's
participation in making treatment decisions for this patient.

While a

request for a court-appointed legal guardian would satisfy the team's
legal obligations to the patient, it does not eliminate their ethical
responsibilities.

That is, even with a legal guardian designated to

make treatment decisions, the health care team is still ethically
accountable for whatever treatment (or non-treatment) they ultimately
provide.
Thus, advocates of a principlist approach would claim that the
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are the ones central to
the solution of this particular case.

Yet, these principles offer no

means for deciding whether beneficence and non-maleficence are best
expressed by continuing or discontinuing this patient's life-sustaining
treatment.

In the final analysis, no matter how carefully the case is

examined and weighed, these principles often end up serving only as post
hoc rationalizations for the health care team's conflicting intuitions
as to what might count (or, alternatively, if anything even can count)
as 'beneficial' or 'burdensome' care for a patient limited to a
vegetative existence.
The push, of course, is for closure.

The health care team is

committed to solving the immediate problem that confronts them:
identifying and meeting their ethical obligations to this particular
patient.

A plan of care was, with considerable discussion, finally

crafted for the patient in this case.

After consultation with the
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hospital ethicist, the health care team concluded that life-extending
treatment offered the patient no benefit.
The health care team requested that a legal guardian be assigned to
the patient, be informed of the patient's situation and asked, as the
patient's legal representative, to give permission for withdrawal of
life-extending medical treatment.

The guardian assigned by the court

concurred with the position of the health care providers and granted
permission to withdraw all medical treatment except for comfort
measures.

Subsequent to the removal of the ventilator, the patient's

respirations and heart beat became erratic.

Within minutes the

patient's own spontaneous respirations and heart beat ceased.

The

patient's eyes became fixed and dilated, and he was pronounced dead.
Because there was no way of ascertaining what this patient's wishes
might have been, the health care team and legal guardian defended this
decision to withhold treatment as the one that best reflected their
concern and respect for this patient and his situation.

They were

agreed that since even delaying the decision-making process is a
decision to do something, whatever decision was made would, in fact,
constitute an act of substituted judgment.

Respecting this patient

entailed careful evaluation of the alternatives in terms of their
fidelity to the general obligation of the care-givers to practice nonmaleficence and beneficence towards patients by choosing the alternative
most consistent with the values and ideals that society has tacitly
endorsed and patients have come to expect health care providers to
support and protect.

Both the care-givers and the legal guardian
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defended withdrawal of life-extending treatment by arguing that it has
been their experience that most persons having the opportunity to decide
this issue in advance for themselves would not choose to be sustained in
a vegetative state.
Case #2: Medical Treatment For A Social Ill
A frail, elderly man without relatives or visitors has
lived in an extended care facility for the past five years.
While needing physical assistance with daily activities, such
as bathing and walking, he is oriented to time and place.
With increasing frequency over the past two years the
following pattern of behavior is observed: the patient
abruptly informs his health care providers that he will no
longer take fluids or food because he wants to die.
Within several days, the man becomes semi-comatose and is
sent to the nearest emergency room where he is re-hydrated by
means of intravenous fluids and/or naso-gastric intubation.
Upon recovery, he consistently expresses regret that he is
still alive and disappointment with his care-takers for having
over-ridden his wishes. The patient temporarily resumes
adequate consumption of fluids and food, only to repeat the
cycle in a few months' time.
Analysis

Assessment of this case requires a very careful medical work-up to
rule out any endogenous depression, i.e., depression caused by organic
processes that may be causing or exacerbating this patient's behavior.
Even the most minor physical symptom, if it becomes chronic, can cause
patients to become frustrated and depressed enough to have periods of
hopelessness.

Only after the health care team is assured that there is,

to the best of their knowledge, no underlying biological or chemical
origin for such behavior can their analysis be extended so as to tease
out the psychological and social factors in the case.
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Next, the psychological aspects of this case must be ascertained.
The health care team needs to make a careful assessment of the patient's
mental status, in both his compliant and non-compliant periods.

This

assessment should include both passively observing the patient's
behavior and actively interviewing the patient to elicit his perceptions
about his situation.

It is crucial for the health care team to

ascertain whether the patient understands and can explain his situation
and his conflicting behavior patterns, including the fit between his
intentions and his actions and the relationship between his actions and
their likely consequences.

In other words, he must be able to provide

coherent reasons for his intentions and in defense of his actions.
Such an assessment is necessary to determine whether this man has
'decisional capacity,' the term currently being used in the fields of
health care and health care ethics to describe the ability of persons to
make autonomous choices about treatment alternatives.

While there are a

number of ways it has been described, 12 decisional capacity standardly
includes these five criteria:
1. understanding: the patient must be able to comprehend and
discuss with a reasonable amount of coherence the relevance of the
information that has been disclosed by the health care providers
2. rationality: the patient must be capable of reasoning
appropriately about means and ends--the patient should be able to
anticipate the probable consequences of choices or actions and, in
contemplating an end, should be able to indicate ways in which it might
be reached
3. opportunity: when time permits, the patient must be given
sufficient time for deliberation to the fullest extent possible
4. absence from coercion: the patient must be protected, as far as
possible, from internal forms of coercion (e.g., pain, faulty processing
of information) and external forms of coercion (e.g., economic pressure,
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intolerable environmental conditions, etc.)
5. authenticity: the values and world-view invoked by the patient
to explain present decisions and behavior should be reasonably
consistent with the values and world-view held by the patient in the
past
To the degree that these five criteria are met, patients are
considered capable of making autonomous decisions about their health
care.

That is why one of the most important assessments care-givers

make in each and every medical encounter is an assessment of a patient's
decisional capacity.

In those patients considered to have decisional

capacity, the principle of autonomy requires care-givers to respect a
patient's right to make his or her own personal health care decisions,
irrespective of whether the care-givers agree with the particular
decision in question.

Parenthetically, it is important to note, here,

that decisional capacity is not the same as legal competence.
"Competence" is a technical legal term and is best reserved for its
technical legal meaning.

By law, all persons who are twenty-one or

older (or who have demonstrated to the court that they have reached the
age of reason) are presumed competent unless formally and specifically
adjudged otherwise.
From the dialogue that inevitably occurs between the health care
team and this particular patient in the course of his care, it should be
possible for the care-givers to elicit from the patient a coherent
account of his behavior and expectations, including whether he
understands the factual relationship between his actions and their
likely consequences.

The patient's past records should be reviewed for

insights into the possible reasons for his conflicting sets of behavior
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patterns.

For example, has anyone previously asked the patient about

his views concerning death, what his life plans and goals both are and
were, and how he relates these to each other?

Perhaps it is not so much

that he wants to die as that he simply does not want to continue to live
in this manner.
In addition, the health care team should investigate whether the
patient has exhibited a chronic or intermittent fixation concerning loss
of control over his life, a fixation that may render him unable to make
a realistic assessment of his actual over-all situation.

Perhaps he

feels disenfranchised and abandoned by his cornmunity--not an
unreasonable or unjustified observation, given the way the frail and
elderly in our society are often treated. 13

Does the patient interact

thoughtfully and coherently with his environment?

Does he have any

sustained relationships with anyone at the facility?

These are the

kinds of questions that must be asked and answered as thoroughly as
possible in order to ascertain whether the patient adequately
understands his situation and is capable of making autonomous choices
regarding his health care.
In this particular case the health care team requested a
psychiatric consultation.

The psychologist found that the patient

demonstrated a clear understanding of the implications of his refusal to
take food or fluids in both his compliant and non-compliant phases.

His

reasons for taking these actions remained consistent in both phases: he
had outlived all of his friends and family, and no longer had any
outside interests.

The patient felt that, while he had lived a very
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full and active life, he now experienced no personal or vicarious joys
or satisfaction in his continued existence and was unable to accept the
extent of his dependence on his care-givers.

He had, in sum, nothing of

value to live for and, unable to accept such a life of dependency,
preferred that his life be over.
When asked why he would return to a compliant stage after his bouts
of rejecting food and fluids, he replied that battling his care-givers
was such hard work that he needed time to regain his strength.

In other

words, his compliant phases were not evidence of inconsistency in his
understanding or his reasons for acting as he had.

The psychologist

concluded that, in spite of the fact that the patient's behavior seemed
to be exacerbated by an exogenous depression (a depression that is
caused by factors external to the patient), there was no indication that
this patient's capacity to make decisions was impaired.
A factor that weighs heavily in any psychiatric evaluation is the
realization that, as in this patient's case, being depressed does not
automatically render a person incapable of making rational decisions.
There are circumstances in which depression is a most reasonable
emotional response, so much so that its lack might actually be construed
as an inappropriate or unreasonable emotional response.
The social aspects of the case are fairly straight-forward on the
standard approach.

This man claims no family or friends and no social

or religious affiliations.

He receives minimal social security benefits

and resides in a typical state-run extended care facility.

While he

participates in the activities that occur at the facility, he does so
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indifferently, as though fulfilling empty requirements.

He is distantly

polite, but remains firm in his rejection of all attempts to persuade
him to give up his desire to end his life.

But we will see that this

is, at best, a superficial account of what is socially significant here.
The members of the health care team have, in this case, a
commitment to a view of the patient's good that appears to differ
significantly from the patient's. 14

This is because the health care

professions place a very high value on preserving life in our society.
They are committed to offering life-extending treatment to patients who
are not terminally ill and, thus, come to equate such treatment with
acting from the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.
Therefore, a patient who demonstrates clear evidence of decisional
capacity while persisting in what the care-givers see as selfdestructive behavior can be exceedingly frustrating for care-givers.
Unfortunately, to continue rescuing this patient from his own
behavior while failing to change his underlying rationale for that
behavior will only compound the problem since, in addition to being
frustrating and futile, it actually increases this patient's distress.
This mismatch has not been adequately addressed by either the standard
approach to health care ethics or the ethics of the health care
professions.

One primary source of the mismatch in this case lies in a

difference of emphasis or focus concerning the meaning that 'life' has
for the health care team and the patient respectively, a topic that will
receive more detailed analysis in chapter four.
Generally speaking, however, the health care providers' focus is on
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life as a means to an end, as a necessary condition for the possibility
of anything else.

But as a necessary means to every possible end, life

so understood can appear to have an absolute value.

Consequently, it is

all too often the case that, an underlying, unstated and unrecognized
assumption by health care providers develops that, irrespective of the
quality of a particular patient's life, life must treated as an end in
itself and, thus, as desirable by all rational patients.

From this

perspective, choosing not to continue living is construed as irrational.
The four primary goals of health care providers mentioned earlier
in the first case of this chapter, as well as the principles that direct
them, are therefore seen as directed towards sustaining life.

In this

case, however, the patient has repeatedly demonstrated his rejection of
life as inherently valuable.

He finds it both counterproductive and

irrational to pursue--or to be forced to pursue--its continuance.

He

has not, in fact, lost sight of his life as a means, but considers it to
be a means that not only no longer serves his ends, but actually
frustrates them.

It is possible that his care-givers might help him to

see value in continuing to live, i.e., to see valuable ends to which his
life is a means.

But, should such efforts fail, the mismatch between

his views and the care-givers' response to the standard views of their
professional obligations will persist.
Another source of the frustration for the care-givers lies in their
recognition of the causal connection between this patient's sustained
rejection of his current existence and the social conditions
contributing to the quality of that existence.

That is, our society's
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economic commitments to the elderly have tended to be grudging, at best.
As a result, sustained attempts by our culture to include, as active and
valued members of the community, elderly who are no longer completely
self-sufficient, remain half-hearted and ineffectual.

As with the

previous case discussed, the care-givers involved with this man's case
are concerned to provide this patient with care that is equitable to
other patients in similar circumstances.

But, since elderly patients in

these circumstances are frequently sent to nursing homes that, in one
degree or another, effectively remove them from societal interactions,
the principle of justice, as standardly conceived, offers little solace
for patient or care-giver alike.

Here, one might say that, while the

principle of justice is formally recognized, there are, as it were, no
'habits' in place--no institutional structures, no familiar patterns of
practice, no recognizable means--for its effective realization.
In addition, even when the care-givers are sensitive to this
connection, the prevailing view of the care-givers' obligations to
patients is silent concerning what, if anything, care-givers can or
should do to address this issue.

As a result, care-givers can come to

feel as though they have been thrust into the position of fulfilling the
tacit, formal requirements the health care institution promises the
public without access to the most effective means of doing so.

One such

means might be a political voice that can bear witness to the adverse
effects that seemingly isolated and unrelated social conditions have on
the health and lives of all individuals, but especially the weak, poor
and elderly.

But this is not something ordinarily considered an ethical

47

requirement of health care professionals.
Furthermore, each of these four patient-centered goals can
represent an expression of sensitive caring.

Yet there are conflicting

interpretations about their meaning and relevance for any given
individual, especially in light of the psychosocial realities of this
patient's life.

As a result, any one of these goals, when assumed

without the participation or approval of a patient who has decisional
capacity, can result in that patient being treated merely as means to
ends that, in reality, no longer include him.
This is a most inexcusable form of paternalism irrespective of
whether it is motivated from the principles of beneficence or nonmaleficence or not.

Hence, pursuing any of these goals as values

removed from the patient's psychosocial reality or appealing to any of
the principles that guide us in understanding these goals as if they
were isolated and apriori without discussing what, in each particular
case, counts as good reasons in favor of their support is worse than
meaningless.

Doing so prevents patients who have some degree of

decisional capacity from participating to the degree that they are able
in decisions about their own situation.

This would, in effect, cause

the care-givers to violate the autonomy principle in the name of
benevolence.

As a result, actions that the care-givers construe as

flowing from the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence can
actually promote or increase, rather than ameliorate, a patient's
suffering.
Once again, mis-matches and gaps in analysis derive from the
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inadequacy of the concept of personhood and relationship presupposed by
the standard approach.

In this particular case, the health care

providers decided that, since the patient was not terminally ill, they
could not passively acquiesce to his wishes to be allowed to die as a
result of his refusal of fluids and food.

They are left with the

alternative of continuing to send this patient, when he becomes unstable
and semi-comatose, to the emergency room, to be aggressively treated for
his self-induced dehydration and starvation.
Case #3: Hyperacute Rejection Syndrome

During an otherwise unremarkable pregnancy, a 26 year old
woman developed myocarditis, a severely damaging inflammation
of the heart which interferes with the ability of the heart to
pump blood efficiently. Although she eventually delivered a
premature but viable and healthy infant, the patient's own
cardiac function deteriorated to the point where a transplant
was the only remaining chance for saving her life. After
delivery, a properly matched donor heart eventually became
available and she underwent a transplantation that involved no
immediate complications.
Several hours post-transplant and while she was still in
the recovery room, the patient's cardiac function rapidly
began to deteriorate. It was apparent that she was
experiencing a 'hyperacute rejection' (a process of organ
transplant rejection whose etiology is poorly understood and
which in about 95% of cases leads to repeat rejection should
another transplant be attempted). The patient was placed on
mechanical pump support as the newly transplanted heart could
no longer provide the pumping action required to keep the
patient alive. While she is currently awake, able to speak
and rational, the mechanical pump is, at its present stage of
technological development, only a stop-gap measure.
Therefore, if this patient does not receive another heart
transplant, she will die.
When a heart which is a good match for this patient
finally becomes available, it also happens to be an equally
good match for another potential recipient who is awaiting
transplant for the first time. The hospital ethics committee
is asked whether the transplant team should re-transplant this
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patient or give the heart to the other waiting candidate.
Analysis

Some of the biological facts of this case are quite clear in their
implications.
attempted.

This young woman will die unless a second transplant is

In addition, since her first transplant failed because of

hyperacute rejection, the likelihood that she will reject the second
attempt is 95%.

The current rejection rate for heart transplants on a

first attempt is approximately 5-8%.

Therefore, if the other waiting

candidate is given priority, there is a significant increase in the
probability that the salvaged heart will not be rejected.
Unfortunately, an important biological aspect of the case remains
problematic.

Hyperacute rejection is a syndrome that can be neither

prevented nor, given the current state of the art, corrected after it
occurs.

Moreover, there is no way of anticipating which particular

patients are at a greater risk for developing this syndrome.

In other

words, while statistics can offer valid inferences about the
characteristics of a group of persons on the basis of numerical
information obtained from a randomly selected sample of the group (i.e.,
the inference is from sample to larger population group), it cannot be
used in reverse to identify which individuals within the population
group exhibit the characteristics in question.

Therefore, since

patients prone to hyperacute rejection syndrome cannot be identified in
advance, the syndrome cannot be used prospectively either to disqualify
certain potential transplant recipients or to modify their ranking on
the waiting list.
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As far as the psychological aspects of the case are concerned, one
would want to know precisely what the patient and her family and/or
significant others had been told pre-operatively about transplantation
and its possible complications, about the dismal prospects of surviving
hyperacute rejection syndrome should it occur, and about the conditions
under which re-transplantation would or would not be considered as an
option.

One would also want to know the patient's response to this

information and her understanding of its implications.

In addition,

while this patient is currently presumed to have decisional capacity,
the health care team or teams involved need to elicit from the patient
just what that amounts to for her, from her particular perspective. 15
The main social aspects of the case are three-fold and concern the
relationships between (1) the patient and the larger community, (2) the
patient and the health care professionals that are her current caregivers and (3) the community and the care-givers.

As far as the first

relationship is concerned, the very existence of the national transplant
program and all of the various social institutions connected with it
clearly imply a de facto commitment on the part of the larger community
to the quality of the lives of its individual members as potential
transplant recipients.
Similar to the commitment of health care professionals to patients
expressed in their respective codes of ethics, this commitment of the
community to its members is governed by the principles of beneficence
and non-maleficence. 16

However, along with this commitment come

utilitarian considerations of distribution that may directly conflict
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with particular patients' best interests as well as the care-givers'
obligations to patients.

Hence, these considerations can place the

principles of autonomy, beneficence and/or non-maleficence in direct
conflict with the principle of justice.
For example, for the transplant team to deny re-transplantation to
this patient--assuming she would want to be re-transplanted--and to
transplant the other potential recipient would clearly provide the
greatest possibility of a successful organ transplant and, hence,
increase the likelihood that the salvaged heart will not be rejected.
However, this is something that care-givers find extremely discomfiting
in their relationships with their patients, since denying retransplantation to the first patient will directly result in her death,
no matter who else might be saved.

Hence, it should be an important

part of the obligation of the community to its members--potential
patients and health care providers alike--to address the need for very
explicit criteria in order to maximize equitable distribution of
salvaged organs.
As far as the second relationship, the one between patient and
care-giver, is concerned, though the health care team does have a
relationship with other potential recipients, it differs from their
relationship with this patient whose death, without re-transplantation
is both imminent and certain.

The death of the operated patient will

predictably occur within hours; the death of the waiting recipient might
be anywhere from a few hours to days, weeks, or possibly even months.
While the death of both is certain, the recent transplant's is more
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imminent because the potential recipient's own heart is still
functioning, albeit poorly.

Hence, given the prevailing view of the

special obligations generated by the patient/provider relationship and a
lack of institutional guidelines concerning re-transplantation in
patients who develop hyperacute rejection syndrome, the transplant team
will understandably see itself as having little choice but to offer retransplantation to the patient whose first transplant has failed.
Yet, at the same time, under the prevailing view of the providers'
obligations to patients, the mere acceptance of a patient as a candidate
for transplant automatically establishes a patient/provider
relationship.

As discussed previously, this relationship traditionally

entails a wholehearted commitment on the part of the care-givers to
embark upon a course of therapy most beneficial for that particular
patient, which includes maximizing that patient's medical good in terms
that can--as much as possible--be understood, identified with and
accepted by the patient.

Therefore, once a health care team embarks

along a course of therapy for a patient under their care, the patient
expects this commitment to be whole-hearted and within the customary
framework of what is available to all patients under similar
circumstances.
Considering their bleak prognoses, it arguably would be more
rational simply not to make re-transplantation an available option to
patients who develop hyperacute rejection syndrome.

However, for health

care providers to make this determination on a one-to-one basis at the
bedside would utterly transform the tacit but, nonetheless, deep and
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therapeutic relationship of trust that has developed between patients
and providers under the prevailing view of patient/provider
relationship.

This is why 'rationing at the bedside'--the practice of

making the care-givers responsible for resource allocation at the
bedside on a case-by-case basis--is considered by many working in the
field of health care to be both therapeutically and ethically suspect.
That is, when the community asks care-givers to adhere to protocols
that, in effect, disadvantage some of their patients to the advantage of
others, it is asking these care-givers to act in ways that place them
squarely at cross-purposes with the commitments, values and principles
they have traditionally been asked to honor towards their patients.
As far as the third relationship is concerned, the one between
care-givers and community, it is also a relationship of implicit mutual
obligations.
senses.

Care-givers are obligated to the community in several

First, the training and practice environments of care-givers

exist, and are supported and encouraged by public institutions and the
pooled resources--which are not solely economic--of the community.
Second, the health care professions are licensed--i.e., given a unique
privilege earned by virtue of their demonstrated expertise--by the
community to engage in practices that are restricted to them alone.

The

community, in turn, is obligated to these care-givers who, because of
their specialized training, improve the over-all quality of the
community through education, research and their ability to provide
increasingly more sophisticated levels care to patients.
However, as in the second case analysis, when the community tacitly
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endorses and reinforces the special and whole-hearted one-to-one
commitment of care-givers to individual patients while, at the same
time, it requires them to make allocation decisions between their
patients--all of whom are recipients of this special commitment--it is
inevitable that there will be serious conflicts not only between these
commitments, but between the principles that inform these commitments as
well.
The hallmark of an ethical dilemma is that, irrespective of what
choice is actively or passively undertaken, some incommensurate good--be
it principle, interest, ideal or value--is irretrievably lost.

But,

still, there are better and worse ways of identifying the implicit
features of a dilemma, so that a particular choice might, at least, be
more compellingly drawn and defended as the less ethically objectionable
and, thus, preferred alternative.

Because the standard approach relies

on the algorithmic application of principles that, in turn, presuppose
conflicting visions of what it is to be a person, it is incapable of
offering a persuasive alternative.

Moreover, if it is to succeed and,

at the same time remain internally consistent, the standard approach
would have to appeal to some meta-principle, or set of meta-principles,
in order to explain and/or justify how these principles are to be
applied when they conflict.
this respect.

The standard approach does not succeed in
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CHAPTER THREE
DEWEY'S METHODOLOGY, PURPOSE AND CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS
Introduction

In numerous writings and lectures throughout his long career,
Dewey addressed what he considered to be the central problem of modern
life, namely, that of finding a way to restore the
integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in
which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should
direct his conduct.1, 2
Dewey was convinced that no headway will be made in addressing this
central problem until creative intelligence replaces dogma in the vital
task of resolving problems (whether they have been labelled 'moral' or
'scientific') that confront individuals in their daily lives.

For Dewey

creative intelligence is both the process and product of reflective
inquiry, an unending and dynamic process that is a central
characteristic of sentient beings and the sine qua non of intelligent
behavior.
To the degree that beings can use this process of reflective
inquiry to understand their individual and collective interests and
values, they are able to participate actively in both the modification
of existing interests and values and the creation of new ones, as well
as in the actualization of their interests and values in the rest of
their lives.

For Dewey this task is, in effect, the very purpose of
57
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philosophy.
Since Dewey's method of reflective inquiry and its assumptions are
central to this dissertation, what is needed at this point is a
description of his approach and some cogent remarks in its defense.

To

that end, this chapter will review the basic characteristics, aims and
implications of Dewey's naturalistic and pragmatic theory of experience.
The multi-perspectival, pluralistic approach that underlies Dewey's
philosophical perspective will be defended here, not as something
infallible, but as a most potent antidote against presuppositions
standardly accepted in health care ethics that misdirect our
understanding of experience in general and of relationships with other
individuals in particular.
Dewey's Methodological Perspective

Few philosophers have managed to combine theory and practice in
their lives as successfully as did John Dewey. 3

Like the evolutionary

philosophy he espoused, his own philosophical perspective grew from a
kind of Kantian intuitionism through Hegelian idealism and into various
stages of instrumentalism, culminating in an empirical naturalism that
emphasized reflective inquiry as the most effective mechanism for
understanding and controlling the continuous and dynamic interreactions
between our physical, biological, psychological and social
environments. 4
Dewey's alternative to the methodology used in traditional
approaches in ethics is fairly straightforward.

He argued that instead

of constantly trying to find ready-made prescriptions or formulae to be
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internalized as habits and routinely applied to problematic social and
ethical issues, we need to cultivate a more versatile characteristic of
our intelligence, one that has been restricted, at least for the past
few centuries, to the narrow, practical sphere we call science.

The

habit Dewey wants to see more widely acknowledged and whole-heartedly
adopted when addressing any perplexing issues--whether they concern
fields that are often narrowly designated 'science' or the realm that is
customarily treated separately as 'morals'--is the critical and
practical activity of reflective inquiry. 5
Dewey was convinced that many of the ills that plague modern
society are the result of denying or minimizing the engaged and
practical nature of reasoning.

Dewey's experimentalism was the result

of his overwhelming need to see the world whole by constructing what he
called
a logic, that is, a method of effective inquiry, which would apply
without abrupt breach of continuity to phenomena designated by both
of these words [viz., 'science' and 'morals']. 6
In Logic: The Theory of Inguiry, 7 Dewey identified inquiry simply
as the systematic and progressive determination of an indeterminate
situation.

He painstakingly described what he called the continuum of

inquiry as the process by which beliefs and knowledge are acquired. 8

A

rather radical thesis fundamental to his account was that logical forms
accrue to a subject-matter when it is subjected to controlled inquiry.
By this he did not mean simply that logical forms are revealed or
discovered, but that these logical forms originate in the operations of
inquiry. 9
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This has two very important implications.
inquiry is thoroughly pragmatic.

First, the continuum of

For Dewey, this meant that the goal of

(-

inquiry--the search for truth--is neither a quest for certainty nor a
search for knowledge of some ultimate reality that exists independent of
our experiences or beliefs.

Rather, the goal of inquiry is pragmatic in

the sense that what we identify as 'true' set of statements or beliefs
will depend on how well it helps us to understand experience and to
guide further conduct.

;:::.:;

According to Dewey this means that consequences ,

will function as the necessary tests of the validity of propositions
"provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such
as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations. 10
Second, every aspect of an indeterminate situation--means and ends,
meanings and values, intentions, perspectives and consequences--when
subjected to reflective inquiry, undergoes an evolutionary development
in the process of being converted into "one that is so determinate in
its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of
the original situation into a unified whole. 1111
Hence, when Dewey uses the term 'consequences,' he is not limiting
its meaning to a product of a narrow and linear process, the arguably
narrow perspective of which the consequentialistic approach to ethics is
often accused.

He is reminding us instead that every aspect of our

actions and our reflections on them must constantly be considered in
terms of its impact on every other aspect--and upon itself as well.
other words, this is not merely a linear, future-oriented or forwardlooking perspective.

Rather, because it is a process in which we, as

In
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reflective agents, actively participate, reflective inquiry reconstructs
our past and present as well as our future.
A situation becomes indeterminate and, hence, ripe for reflective
inquiry whenever any reflexive activity--whether personal habit or
public practice--is, for any number of reasons, blocked, disrupted or
fails to produce an expected result.

Such an indeterminate situation

then becomes problematic when our knowledge or understanding of it fails
to correct or explain it.

Our very recognition of a situation as

'problematic' already entails a complex and dynamic process in which
means, ends and perspective are thrown into doubt.

In other words, our

awareness of a situation as problematic signals that reflective inquiry
is already underway.
Moreover, how an indeterminate situation is envisioned as a problem
determines not only what information will be considered relevant to it,
but what will be identified or ruled out as possible solutions to be
tested and evaluated.

Just as inquiry is occasioned by an indeterminate

problematic situation, the elements of the problematic situation are
progressively reconstituted and, ideally, made more determinate by
inquiry.

In short, understanding the world in which we live is a

process of which we are a part, and any knowledge that we might gain
comes from taking part in events in an intelligent--i.e., purposive
rather than reflexive--way.
While the resolved or reconstructed situation solves a particular
problem at hand, it also sets the stage for further inquiry by becoming
not only a means to further ends-in-view, but the source of a whole new
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set of interconnected problems: it is, in this sense, simultaneously an
end and a means.

Recognizing the multifaceted and evolutionary nature

of the elements which constitute our experience permits us to locate and
understand situations and their solutions experientially, and not as
arbitrarily and artificially isolated exercises unconnected to daily
living.

To understand more fully the uniqueness and power of Dewey's

account of reflective inquiry it is helpful to examine his theory of
experience.
Dewey's Pragmatic Theory Of Experience

One of the most frequent accusations levelled against Dewey by his
critics was (and is) that his philosophy blurs rather than clarifies
important distinctions that are traditionally respected by philosophers.
But, unlike those who claim that philosophy is essentially the art of
making fine, precise distinctions, Dewey insisted that, what ever else
it is, philosophy is a 'doing;' that is, it is the means by which we
attempt to use our intelligence to make sense of our existence, to see
the world whole.

As a matter of fact, Dewey agreed that precise

distinctions and their analyses are an important part--but only one
part--of that activity.

That is why he constantly warned against the

folly of allowing any distinction to assume the status of a settled
belief writ large, so to speak, whereby the meaning of a distinction
becomes isolated from the particular problematic situation in which it
was originally addressed.
Dewey often criticized this common but subtle reification of
distinctions, calling it 'the' philosophic fallacy. 12

Dewey saw this
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reification as a by-product of the quest for knowledge of some ultimate
reality independent of experience.

Dewey rejected the metaphysical

assumptions behind this quest insisting that, for us, the importance of
distinctions, like any other statements or beliefs, lies in their
usefulness for making sense of experience and for guiding choice and
action in daily life.

That some distinction 'is the case' always

involves contextual interpretation of the related aspects of the
particular case within which the distinction is being made.

Even the

fact that inquirers might agree about a distinction remains ambiguous
until the story of how and where they came to agree is articulated.

In

other words, the reification of distinctions blurs their usefulness to
us.
Throughout his career, Dewey called for replacing the customary
tradition which combines "atomistic particularism with respect to
empirical material and Platonic a priori realism with respect to
universals" with a naturalistic view in which "every experience in its
direct occurrence is an interaction of environing conditions and an
organism. 1113

In other words, the world and our reflections upon it

constitute, as it were, a unified field: the world and our understanding
of it are not to be considered apart from one another since neither
exists apart from the other for us.
For Dewey, experience is not the isolable product of an interaction
between separate entities and objects.

Nor is it an intersection

between the subjective field of a perceiver and objective 'facts'
neutrally read off of nature.

Rather, it is a continuous transactional

~-
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process wherein perceiver and object are progressively re-constituted.
There is nothing mysterious about this process.

We not only presuppose

it, we expect it and, at times, we specifically invoke it--as when we
ask a person to tell us what she 'sees' in the abstract designs of a
Rorschach test or when scientists provide us with computer-enhanced
photos of Jupiter.
As early as 1896, Dewey introduced his re-interpretation of the
reflex arc, a concept foundational to the science of physiology. 14
Dewey saw in it a means of explaining the unity of experience in all of
its complex diversity and generality.

Because experience is actively

undergone and not passively observed, the stimuli and responses within
experience are not insulated one-way circuits.

Rather, they reverberate

in a multi-directional, responsive and reciprocal manner that modifies
every aspect of, as well as everything that undergoes, the experience.
Dewey continued to build upon this basic notion and by 1938
provided in his massive work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, a detailed
and systematic treatment of the dynamic commonalities of the reciprocal
interactions which occur between all organisms and their environments-commonalities, by the way, that are necessary for the very possibility
of developing the kind of individuation that persons consider to be a
defining feature of sentience:
Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity
that involves an environment. It is a transaction extending beyond
the spatial limits of the organism. An organism does not live in an
environment; it lives by means of an environment ... the only source
of restoration of energy. Not even a hibernating animal can live
indefinitely upon itself .... The processes of living are enacted by
the environment as truly as by the organism; for they are an
integration. 15
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This description has even more significance for interactions
between complex, sentient organisms than it has for interactions of
primitive one-celled organisms since the more complex the organism
and/or the environment become, the greater the complexity and number of
new and different dynamic interreactions that can possibly affect and be
affected by the life of the organism:
Indeed, living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of
disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. The 'higher' the
organism, the more serious become the disturbances and the more
energetic (and often more prolonged) are the efforts necessary for
its reestablishment. The state of disturbed equilibration
constitutes need. The movement towards its restoration is search
and exploration. The recovery is fulfilment or satisfaction. 16
As it is described here, an organism's response to a stimulus is
much more than just a mechanical application of some pre-established
means necessary to some antecedently given end.

Rather, it is a

complicated cascade of reciprocal readjustments by organism and
environment to a series of mutually generated stimuli and responses.

It

is within the course of such dynamic interreactions that organisms and
environments acquire stability and that organisms become progressively
more individuated and potentially more self-aware. 17
Just as primitive organisms, if they are to survive, must rapidly
develop the ability to differentiate between self and non-self in the
course of their interactions with their environments so, too, do more
complex, sentient organisms, including human beings.

Basic textbooks in

human physiology and psychology detail the initial inability of neonates
to recognize self from non-self either immunologically (biologically) or
psychosocially.

Individuation, first biological and then psychosocial,
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is a progressive, developmental affair that is intimately connected with
actively experiencing an environment.

A perspective that is based on

this much richer, bio/psycho/social account confirms the distortion that
can occur in inquiry when any element of this complex and dynamic
integration is examined in isolation from the environment in which it
occurs.

Literally speaking, that element will become incomprehensible.

According to Dewey, bio/psycho/social integrity can be effectuated
in two ways: blind impulse and intelligence. 18

To the degree that

humans are sentient organisms, they are capable of choosing intelligence
over blind impulse in order to advance their goals while continuing to
maintain their bio/psycho/social integrity.

That is, to the degree that

they are self-aware and have memory, they are capable of engaging in
sustained, self-directed reason.

They can make distinctions about

relevant similarities and differences, and they can choose to form the
habit of exercising creative intelligence--Dewey's word for a habit of
responsive and responsible, reflective inquiry--instead of relying on
blind impulse to maintain or to restore what Dewey calls dynamic
equilibration. 19
Science As A Paradigm For Methodology

Most of Dewey's critics--and even some thinkers sympathetic to his
agenda--misunderstand his wholesale endorsement of the scientific method
for all inquiry.

It was never Dewey's intention to reduce ethics,

religion or any other humanistic enterprise to a science, if by science
is meant a descriptive account of material change.

On the contrary,

Dewey rejected any dualistic assumptions that separate science and
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values.

According to Dewey, science can exclude human interests and

valuings no more readily than such fields as ethics and politics can
exclude the inquiries commonly labelled science, much less science in
the broader sense Dewey intended by this word. 20
Rather, Dewey's point in praising science was to emphasize the
unprecedented successes possible in any field or endeavor when dogma and
intolerance are replaced by reflective inquiry.

For Dewey reflective

inquiry, when intelligently pursued, requires simple curiosity and an
open but distinctively critical attitude: a willingness to suspend
belief and expectation and the patience to cultivate healthy doubt until
evidence is accumulated.

Such an attitude rejects, for example, the

anti-intellectual temptation of 'premature closure,' the practice of
making a too hasty assumption compounded by the selective marshalling
facts to confirm it.
According to Dewey ideas are exciting possibilities, the social
products of intelligent and creative individuals who have been
habituated to the process of reflective inquiry. 21

Hence, ideas--

whether the ideas of science or the ideas connected to values--must
never be treated as dogmas to be asserted; rather they are live
hypotheses that are continually open to testing and manipulation.

No

matter how 'settled' a belief or idea, it must always be potentially
falsifiable and open to public scrutiny.

Its very status as a settled

belief is, after all, the result of its continuous reconfirmation in
actual practice.

Dewey believed that these features of reflective

inquiry have been most consistently and successfully modelled in the
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collaborative efforts of scientific communities than by any other
sustained human enterprise to which we might look for examples.
In other words, what Dewey referred to as real science--as opposed
to mere technological production or the rote replication of the
intellectual products of real science--succeeds because it embodies the
public process of deliberate and critical, but always open-ended
reflective inquiry from the very beginning of an indeterminate
situation, where our unreflectively held valuings are challenged,
through the complex process of attempting to make that situation less
indeterminate.

This process includes identifying the indeterminate

situation as a problem, theorizing about it and its possible solutions
and then testing and evaluating the most likely means of resolving it.
According to Dewey, whenever we engage in real science we are employing
precisely this meaning of reflective inquiry.

When he calls for a

'scientific treatment of morality' what Dewey is asking is that we
assume this distinctive critical attitude of reflective inquiry towards
all things--material and immaterial alike--which have developed value
and meaning for us. 22
Consequently, any account of morality that offers a single,
unimpeachable system of evaluating ethically problematic situations will
have closed itself off to elements of experience that are needed if
reflective inquiry into ethical issues is to take place.

On Dewey's

account this closure nearly always occurs because some distinction that
in the past has proven extremely valuable in a specific ethically
problematic case or context has been reified into a universal and
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unchangeable norm instead of being understood as one of many potentially
valuable tools forged out of past fruitful inquiries.

Like any tool,

because of its empirical status, these distinctions are subject to
critical reflection, open to modification and, thus, cannot be fixed or
immutable.
For Dewey, reflective inquiry is also a dynamic social affair: it
is, ideally, a democratic process designed to give meaning and value to
our experiences.

As an abstract social ideal, democracy has often been

associated in contemporary American culture with a vision of the
individual as a pre-existing entity standing over against community.
That is not the sense of the term, 'democratic,' that is intended here.
Rather, the term, 'democratic,' is used here to describe a process--and
an attitude about that process--that is public, social and collaborative
precisely because experience itself is public, social and collaborative.
And so, inquiry is democratic in three important respects.

First,

like science, inquiry actively builds both directly and indirectly on
the results of the past experiences of many individuals.
is public.

Hence, inquiry

Second, even though reflective inquiry is carried on by

individual persons, their individuality is the result of ongoing
interreactions between a self-conscious entity and its environment
(which includes other self-conscious entities).
social.

Thus, inquiry is

Third, even though each person's experiences are of a world

that is populated and shared by other persons, each person has a unique
history that is distinctively brought to bear in reflecting upon any
experience.

Since life's experiences are so very interconnected, myriad

t·
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and complex, each person's narrative of his experiences is a potentially
valuable resource for others.

Therefore, inquiry that is carried on by

persons is much improved by collaboration.
In other words (mine, not Dewey's--though consistent with his
intent), whether viewed as a body of accumulated wisdom or regarded as
an ongoing process, reflective inquiry is carried on by self-reflective
individuals dialogically, but in the very broadest sense of that term,
i.e., referring neither to a pattern of logical argumentation nor to a
mere synthesis of two opposites, but rather to the kind of democratic
and interdependent engagement that occurs when a community of
individuals come together seeking solutions to common problems.

This

community can be any group--scientists, politicians, the town hall, a
family, the health care team.

Such dialogue occurs whenever any number

of individuals come together to listen to one another, and to address
together whatever is problematic that they face together, in the attempt
to understand each other's different perspectives and to modify their
responses accordingly.

This kind of living, evolutionary communicative

engagement Dewey regards as the sine qua non of reflective inquiry.
Some might also want to construe reflective inquiry as a 'dialogue'
with oneself.

Certainly this tendency is present in individualistically

oriented societies like our own.

However, Dewey would insist that this

'internal dialogue' is dialogue only derivatively, in the sense that it
depends on one's being able to represent an hypothetical 'other' with
which to rehearse for dialogue. 24

There is also a sense in which some

might be tempted to say that the 'dialogue' of reflective inquiry can
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occur between an individual and some inanimate object within that
individual's experience--say, a textbook.

Yet, this is simply an

individual's response to a culturally constructed and understood
stimulus framed and communicated in terms of meanings which are already
publicly shared.
Because in both these instances there is a lack of mutual
understanding and active engagement (to some degree or other) by all
participants in the discussion, these two examples remain dialogues in a
very attenuated and potentially misleading sense since the rest of the
community is not actively participating.

On the other hand, the

activity of the physical scientist at her workbench is a dialogue in
Dewey's sense to the degree that she is able to elicit from the
materials she is testing a falsifiable 'response,' that is, a response
which can be publicly understood and duplicated, and to which she and
others in the community can respond in turn.
Accordingly, genuine inquiry must meet the requirements of
dialogue: (1) active engagement, (2) publicity, (3) an effort towards
mutual understanding of and respect for differences, (4) openness to the
inevitability of modification or change and (5) a willingness to allow
ourselves, individually, to be led by the dynamic of the inquiry rather
than by our own predetermined expectations and interests.

As a

deliberate and dynamic habit or practice in problem solving, reflective
inquiry is social through and through and encompasses past, present and
future.

When Dewey considers moral inquiry, then, he associates these

five characteristics with it as well, for then it is inquiry at its
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best; it is the richest activity of intelligence at work; it is--to use
the word Dewey often used for the purpose--science.
Dewey's is a pluralistic philosophy that, in its characterization
of the creative intelligence of individuals as a social process of
deliberate, sustained and reflective inquiry, makes it possible to
celebrate the diversity and difference in its participants as strengths
rather than as weaknesses.

Because his theory of inquiry rejects the

alleged discontinuity between science and philosophy and emphasizes the
multi-perspectival, pluralistic, fallibilistic and pragmatic character
of creative intelligence wherever it operates, it is especially
appropriate for addressing conflicts that arise in the field of health
care.

The present re-examination and critique of problematic

patient/provider relationships and the effort to add to how they are
described in the current health care literature presupposes and utilizes
the central assumptions of Dewey's philosophical approach that have been
explained here.
Concluding Remarks:
The Relevance of Dewey's Approach for this Dissertation

The approach adopted in this dissertation is one that takes
seriously Dewey's objections to the traditional philosophical approaches
to the analysis of ethical problems in general and adapts his
alternative philosophical methodology specifically to ethical issues in
health care.

It begins by accepting, right at the outset, the

implications that follow from recognizing the actual situatedness of
sentient, rational experience.

While this approach appeals to many of
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the same principles, rules, goals, values and virtues as the traditional
approaches, these concepts are informed by a different set of
presuppositions about the nature of persons.

This different set of

presuppositions acknowledges the interdependence that characterizes
persons by incorporating into all discussion and deliberation the
dynamic and fluid interrelationships between the complex and evolving
environmental, biological, psychological and social aspects of sentient,
rational existence.
Within this alternative approach concepts such as autonomy--whether
they are taken to be principles, values or virtues--have no apriori
essence or standing.

Rather, they are treated as encrypted

generalizations culled from the distilled wisdom of past experiences--an
individual's own and others--having, as yet, ambiguous meaning for the
people involved and the particular situation at hand.

They represent

ways in which the meanings of similar problems in the past have been
expressed and/or addressed.

Like basic recipes, they are versatile

tools that help us to produce novel creations and variations depending
upon the ingredients at hand.
The approach espoused in this work is a process whereby differing
perspectives concerning a situation are, through the interreactive
communication of dialogue, sought out and encouraged.

Each alternative

is subjected to what Dewey often referred to as 'dramatic rehearsal,'
the equivalent of thought-experiments in science, wherein the
antecedents and consequents of a indeterminate situation are
imaginatively envisioned from a number of different perspectives and
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critically examined so that the tentative results obtained might be
integrated into current communication and debate.

Analogous to the

improvement binocular vision offers over monocular vision, the benefit
of being able to view a situation from more than one perspective lies in
its clarity in making accessible to us the requisite contrasts and
comparisons needed in order to assess the significance of the
interrelationships with a given situational field.
This activity of comparison and contrast is, in turn, somewhat
analogous to the movements one makes in bringing a microscope into
focus: the barrel of the microscope is wheeled up and down in
progressively smaller ranges until the specimen on a slide is brought
into the sharpest focus.

Similarly, as elements of the indeterminate

situation are brought into focus--become more determinate--tentative
hypotheses are developed from the elements of the situation itself,
alternative solutions are imaginatively tested and possible consequences
compared and evaluated.

As the process continues all of the elements of

the situation are funded with meaning, including the principles of
action that guide further responses to the situation and the
consequences of its resolution.

As a result, an indeterminate situation

becomes more determinate.
Thus, this alternative approach differs both in its emphasis on
interdependence as a characteristic rather than a defect of persons and
in its adoption of a method of inquiry that is better equipped to
explain these dynamic interrelationships.

Consistent with its emphasis

on interdependence, this approach relies upon the provision of an
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environment that is conducive to communication and discussion, since it
requires an opening, as it were, within which a meaningful story can
develop out of a problematic situation that is fraught with
indeterminancy.
Before an assessment of this alternative approach can be
undertaken, however, both the presuppositions about persons and
relationships underlying the traditional approaches and the four
principles that these presuppositions inform (namely, autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice), need to be reconstructed.
That is the focus of chapter four.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RE-ASSESSING SOME TRADITIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONS ABOUT PERSONS
Of Persons and Patients: Concepts and Experience

While there are a number of ways in which ethical issues between
patients and health care providers can be discussed and analysed,
persons remain the primary unit of moral reference and, thus, the
central feature of such discourse.

The focus of this chapter is to

examine some prevalent presuppositions about persons that shape and are
shaped by the set of concepts (especially autonomy and beneficence, but
indirectly non-maleficence and justice as well) that are relied upon so
prominently in standard approaches to health care ethics analysis today.
The importance, ranking and use of these concepts--whether, for
example, they are treated primarily as abstract principles or as
concrete values--depends largely on the particular philosophical
approach in question.

But, irrespective of approach, the utilization of

some variation of this set of concepts is central to most contemporary
discussions, especially in health care ethics, concerning how to
identify and to protect or to restore what are considered to be
definitive characteristics of persons.

By examining how these

characteristics are expressed and reinforced in habitual behavior, our
presuppositions about what it is to be a person can be identified and
subjected to further inquiry.
78
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The next several sections discuss problems associated with
conceptualizing these characteristics when the concepts used to do so
are not fine-grained enough to do the work asked of them because of
insufficiently critical presuppositions about persons upon which they
are based.

The perspectives explained in chapter three, drawn from the

work of John Dewey, will be especially useful in unpacking the errors of
these presuppositions and how they affect the standard health care
ethics approach.
A Caution About Concepts

A concept is generally construed as the product of an attempt to
capture and to fix in an abstract and non-dynamic form certain generic
aspects of a complex, concrete experience which is fluid and dynamic.
When considered alone, bereft of context, this non-dynamic form can
serve only as a reminder of the potential that an experience can have
for a person, depending on antecedent conditions (which include the
distilled wisdom learned from past experiences--our own, but especially
that communicated to us by others), present context and the availability
of the means necessary for realizing those possibilities.
Until the material conditions of the particular story or case it is
connected with are identified, the meaning of a concept will retain a
certain openness which gives it its characteristic ambiguity.

When a

situation is read in terms of some favored or pre-determined
understanding of such a concept, that open range of possibilities can be
prematurely closed and the possibility of a mismatch between concept and
reality increases.

When this happens, our understanding of a situation
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can actually become more rather than less indeterminate.
Concepts are important tools that can function very well as
effective pieces of intellectual short-hand.

However, it is possible

for a concept, like any tool, to obfuscate as well as to clarify an
already indeterminate situation.

The meaning of any concept cannot be

given once and for all because its context is never given once and for
all.

That is, the meaning of a concept changes as the bio/psycho/social

field within which it functions and is framed changes.

Whenever aspects

of an existence that is inherently characterized by change are isolated
and fixed by externally pre-established concepts--whether these have
been formulated as principles, rules, criteria, values or virtues--there
is an element of risk involved.

These concepts can distort our

understanding of an experience by artificially isolating and fixing upon
certain aspects of an existence that is, in reality, both more complex
and inherently characterized by change.
The difficulty is exacerbated if we allow ourselves to assume the
adequacy of and to be guided by a single pre-interpreted perspective in
the attempt to make sense of unexpected hitches in our complex and
evolving interrelationships, experiences that are marked by periods of
disruption as well as periods of dynamic and homeostatic balance.

To

the degree that we uncritically accept and act from such a perspective
we eliminate, without adequate reason, certain points of view and, in
turn, certain possible meanings of and alternative resolutions for an
indeterminate situation.

This is why what are today called

'principlist' approaches--i.e., ones that analyse indeterminate
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situations by applying concepts externally pre-established from a
particular pre-existing perspective--are·so problematic.

The discussion

of health care ethics that issues from today's standard perspective, as
exemplified in chapter two, suffers from just this problem.
The Myth of The Independent Agent

One of the central tenets of the standard approach to health care
ethics being examined here is the belief that a person's autonomy is
compromised by illness.

This belief is based on the fact that, when

functionally-compromised by injury or illness, a person becomes more
dependent on others.

According to this approach, this reduction in a

person's ordinary functioning is said to contribute to a reduction in
her autonomy.
Now, it is fairly straight-forward and uncontroversial that, as
illness decreases a person's ability to function, it increases that
person's dependence upon others.

Unfortunately, what too often occurs

within the standard approach is that dependence itself, rather than its
relative increase or decrease, is set in opposition to autonomy.

This

reinforces a presumption that persons are not normally dependent but,
rather, complete and self-contained entities that exist independently
from the rest of their environment unless or until they become
functionally compromised.
Closely connected to this presumption is the belief that, under
ordinary conditions, persons control whether and how their lives will
affect and be affected by others.

As a result, autonomy comes to be

treated as the 'default mode' of human existence and is defined in terms
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of atomistic isolation: persons are self-defining, self-sufficient and
completely self-determined.

In this default mode, justice is

represented primarily in negative terms, such as non-interference and
non-maleficence; and any role that beneficence might have is limited to
those exceptional circumstances when such an atomistic view of persons
either has been or is in danger of being compromised.

In short,

autonomy is held in stark opposition to dependency of any sort and the
cooperative interdependence required in actual living--if the autonomy
that persons are actually capable of is to develop and flourish--is
ignored.
But there is no such necessary one-to-one connection in real life
between autonomy and independence.

Respecting a person as an autonomous

being actually requires taking into account an interdependence of the
very sort ignored by this atomistic interpretation of autonomy.
Interdependence need not be viewed as a defect, even when it is
increased or modified as a result of illness or injury; it is already a
fundamental fact of human existence.

As Dewey put it:

The idea of a natural individual in his isolation possessed of
full-fledged wants, of energies to be expended according to his own
volition, and of a ready-made faculty of foresight and prudent
calculation is as much a fiction in psychology as the doctrine of
the individual in possession of antecedent political rights is one
in politics. 1
In other words, a person does not exist in a ready-made form that can be
disembodied or disembedded from all context.

A person participates in

and evolves within a dynamic and continuous field of complex
interreactions.
Therefore, when the standard approach to health care ethics narrows
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its view of autonomy to total independence, it necessarily misses many
important features of the issues it examines, as the re-examination of
chapter two's cases in chapter five will make clear.
Zoe and Bios

In order to understand why the concepts we use to talk about
persons are especially problematic--a difficulty that is wide-spread,
but especially problematic for the standard approach--it will be helpful
to look at our English word, 'life.'

As it is used in English it is a

particularly ambiguous concept because it does not distinguish between
'being alive' and 'having a life. 12

In Greek, there are two words, zoe

and bias, used to refer to the concept known in English as 'life.'
is life in a biological sense, i.e., 'being alive.'

Zoe

Zoe provides the

basis of our word, zoology, the biological science of animals.
Bias, on the other hand, is life in a bio/psycho/social sense,
i.e., 'having a life.'

Bios is the basis of our word, biography, a

written history of a person. 3
life, one must be alive.

Bios presupposes zoe insofar as to have a

But zoe (being alive) does not guarantee bios

(having a life), it merely provides the biochemical substrate for its
possibility.
life.

Bios--having a life--means being a reflective subject of a

That is, having a life entails sufficient consciousness--at

minimum, a rudimentary sentience and memory--to recognize self and
environment, to appreciate how they are interconnected, and to effect a
delicate balance of those interconnections through the ability to reason
about means and ends.
Persons, in addition to being alive, are also rightly said to
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possess that life.

A person is the subject, the agent/patient as it

were, of a particular life, with a particular history, within a
particular dynamic and holistic set of environing conditions and
experiences--environmental, biological, psychological and social.
Persons actively undergo life in the sense of bios; because they are
able to reflect upon experiences--both direct and vicarious ones--they
can learn to modify experience as well as their responses to it by
becoming active participants rather than merely passive recipients.
This is why bios cannot be reduced to or explained solely in terms of
zoe.
The implications of this distinction for health care are especially
profound since the zoe-istic or biological aspects of life cannot take
account of the role that the psycho/social elements characteristic of
having a life play in constituting persons.

Without concepts in

discourse that distinguish clearly between being alive and having a
life, it is difficult to avoid a mechanistic view of persons that sees
them as discrete and self-contained objects that merely react to other
objects in their environment, and to adopt, instead, a holistic view of
persons as reflective subjects of lives who are constantly redefining
and being redefined by their participation in a dynamic and homeostatic
interrelationship with an environment.

The term, 'homeostasis,' is used

here to express the fluid and dynamic nature of both the elements that
are interreacting and the activity of balancing those elements so as to
optimize one's existence within and with an environment.
This failure of the standard approach to sufficiently distinguish
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between being alive and having a life also reinforces what, in the
culture of the United States, is already an overly atomistic
interpretation of persons that, in turn, influences the way other
concepts central to ethical discourse in health care are treated.

In

order to answer questions about what constitutes treating persons who
are patients with respect, the factors that must be taken into account
and addressed regarding persons are not those belonging to zoe, but to
bias.

So, by adopting this distinction between having a life and being

alive, we could more readily focus upon what is distinctive about
persons and articulate a much richer understanding of the concepts
associated with that distinctiveness.
Unfortunately, the standard approach to health care ethics today is
as narrow in its conception of life as it is in its conception of
autonomy/independence.

The distinction articulated here in terms of zoe

and bias plays little role in the analysis of cases according to the
standard approach, as the examples in chapter two demonstrate.

When

these cases are re-examined in chapter five, the implications of
distinguishing between being alive and having a life will be developed
in more concrete detail.

In the next section, an examination of John

Dewey's analysis of organisms in relationship to their environments will
contribute to this discussion.
An Alternative Set of Presuppositions About Persons
Based on the Concept of Bias

In his discussion of the reciprocal interaction between a living
organism and its equally complex and dynamic environment, Dewey
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discusses how organisms become individuated and why the integrity of the
organism/environment interrelationship is a critical material condition
for the integrity of the organism itself. 4

Such a holistic way of

conceptualizing an organism not only emphasizes the elemental and
dynamic homeostatic interrelationship between every organism--not only
the human organism--and its environment.

It also reflects how complexly

and inextricably organisms--especially human organisms--are mutually
bound to one another and to the environment they share.

In fact, the

interdependence between organism and environment is so profound that the
organism is literally indefinable and incomprehensible when isolated
from that environment:
The processes of living are enacted by the environment as truly as
by the organism; for they ~r~ an integration .... [It is not simply]
that a fish lives in the water and a bird in the air, but that the
characteristic functions of these animals are what they are because
of the special way in which water and air enter into their
respective activities. 5
Similarly, the characteristic functions of the intelligent organisms we
call persons are what they are because of the special way in which
environment enters into the activities of persons.

On this account,

what a person's basic needs and interests are and how they might be met
are bio/psycho/social constructs insofar as they are a mutual evolution
of organism and environment. 6

Persons, when considered in total

isolation from the environment within which they pursue the activities
connected to their having a life, are also quite literally indefinable
and incomprehensible.
One implication of this evolutionary interrelationship is that it
is profoundly irrational for persons, in the course of satisfying their
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own basic needs and interests, to act from the belief that they must
consider themselves in opposition either to each other or to their
environment.

Both organism and environment mutually participate in and

contribute to the determination of the organism's basic needs and
interests; therefore, if individual persons are to flourish {i.e., if
they are to have a life, if they are to have their basic needs and
interests met, if they are to benefit from their participation in a part
of a bio/psycho/social existence), their integrity cannot be purchased,
either routinely or for very long, but only briefly and superficially,
at the expense of disrupting the integrity of the rest of the
environment of which they are a part.

In this sense, it is quite

correct to say that the flourishing of the individual entails the
flourishing of the whole.

The contrast between this conception of

persons and that presupposed by the standard approach, especially in its
appeals to its particular notion of autonomy, is significant.
Consequently, an important part of what it means for persons to
maintain a homeostatic balance within an environment includes their
realization that, in satisfying their needs and interests, they must do
so in such a way that the integrity of the organism/environment
interrelationship is respected.

This presupposes that persons, as

intelligent organisms, are capable of understanding and acting in a
manner consistent with this fact, namely, that their own well-being and
flourishing depends on preserving and enhancing the delicate balance of
all organism/environment interrelationships.

More specifically, since

persons' needs and interests are so heavily influenced by and bound up
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with the social aspects of their environment, persons must understand
that the satisfaction of their needs and interests depends upon, in
fact, can only be a consequence of, an irreducible and dynamic
connection between individuals.

The atomic individual idealized in the

standard account of autonomy is a fiction, and is capable of profoundly
disrupting persons in their quest to meet their needs and interests.
Thus, for one person to have a life in any relevant sense (bios)
requires the existence and involvement of others who can also recognize,
value (even if only potentially or vicariously) and, in some situations,
creatively participate in that life.

No matter how self-directed or

self-sufficient individuals do become, and ought to become in
actualizing their potentialities, a whole community of others will have
had, and will continue to have, a hand in both the development and the
continued flourishing of every individual.
Moreover, it is important to understand here that it is not simply
intimate personal others who have a hand in this activity, but all
others--even those never personally known to the individual--who
publicly and privately participate in the creation of that community-which is made up myriad kinds of particular relationships, associations
and comrnunities--of others.

That is, a community of persons is the

function of persons interreacting with, and by means of, each other and
their surrounding environment.

The resulting character of that

community affects and is affected by every person's interreactions.

In

short, individuals need a complex, many-faceted nurturing community to
help them develop their own unique capacities and talents.

Communities,
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moreover, if they are to flourish and to interreact with individuals in
this way, in turn need individuals who are motivated to reciprocate such
nurturing and care in their own unique ways.
Thus Dewey's account of the reciprocal and dynamic interdependence
that exists between organism and environment and his description of how
that interdependence modifies the development and capacities of both
organism and environment provides an alternative way of understanding
ourselves as persons and of understanding, therefore, the nature of our
obligations to one another.

Each person has a unique biography; but it

is one which others have played, and continue to play, an integral part
in creating, nurturing and protecting.

In other words, I am the person

I am because of contributions others have made towards satisfying my
basic needs and helping to develop my particular talents and interests;
and these contributions began long before I was capable of recognizing
self from non-self.
In addition, the satisfaction of basic needs and the assistance
given me in developing my particular talents and interests are things I
neither contracted for nor solicited from others--irrespective of
whether I could or would have.

The notion, so common in contemporary

discussions of autonomy, that contract precedes social interaction is as
false as that of the atomic individual.

A significant portion of the

conditions of my existence have been and continue to be outside of me
and, yet, are also intimately bound up in my self-identity.

That other

persons routinely and without being expressly solicited have, for
example, prevented or relieved my suffering from unmet basic needs is
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indicative of the fact that I am valued--for whatever diverse reasons.
To the extent that I am who I am rests on the fact that I have been
valued in this manner, I cannot even begin to describe myself in terms
that exclude this fundamental interrelationship with others.
My understanding of myself and my expression of my own value may be
distinguished from, but it cannot be separated from this complex
bio/psycho/social interdependence between myself and my environment.

To

the degree that I am sentient and rational, these facts will therefore
command my attention and demand an accounting, since a central feature
of what it is to be sentient and rational is the ability to reflect
critically about (i.e., to make sense of) one's situation.

Another common

falsification of our situation is that autonomous individuals reflect
first alone and only later bring their reflections to others.

But in

point of fact, such reflection includes the process of asking and giving
reasons--a process that itself presupposes community rather than
isolation.
Moreover, it is only in comprehending my existential situation as
one of fundamental interdependence that the origin and reciprocal
character of such notions as debt, gratitude, trust, sympathy, empathy,
responsibility and obligation begin to unfold and become determinate.
This interdependence implies that obligation and, in turn, other
concepts through which obligation is expressed (e.g., autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice) must be understood not as
duties imposed on persons from without, but as intrinsic elements that
belong to having a life.

That is, interdependence and obligation are no
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different from any other concepts insofar as they are the attempts of
persons to make explicit the meanings of the norms that are implicit in
the social practices they participate in and within which they are
already immersed.
These particular concepts are generated as a result of the myriad
inferences persons make and tacitly share about their mutual situation.
Because of the way in which they are generated, concepts cannot possibly
have a meaningful existence outside of the 'having' of a life, outside
of an experience that is thoroughly bio/psycho/social.

Concepts are

neither derived nor imposed from without; they represent the explicit
working out of what is already implicit in a dynamic and complexly
evolving bio/psycho/social existence.
Autonomy as a Bio/psycho/social Concept

On this reconstructed view of persons, autonomy can no longer be
viewed as the ideal independence of an isolated, individual self.
Instead our notions of self-rule, self-control, self-determination,
self-governance, freedom, liberty, choice must all be taken to refer to
an individual self that is neither simply a finished product of
organism/environment interaction nor some disembedded, implacable and
disinterested spectator but, in fact, a person that has unique and
distinctive traits by reason of being an entity capable of intelligence
and embedded in a dynamic organism/environment field in process.
Autonomy, on this reconstructed view, comes to signify much the same
thing as Dewey spoke of as 'freedom':
a distinctive way of behaving in conjunction and connection with
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other distinctive ways of actin~, not a self-enclosed way of acting
independent of everything else.
It is simply impossible for the result of an individual person's
proper growth and development to be 'autonomous' in the sense
presupposed by the standard approach, i.e., completely self-reliant and
isolated from the influence of others.

Rather, the stability and self-

possession associated with the functions so highly prized by persons as
being a part of what they consider autonomy to be can, in fact, occur
only within a particular kind of environment, one of nurturing and care,
a milieu characterized by the existence of already complex cooperative
interrelationships and practices, both tacit and explicit, and both
spontaneous collaborative activities and carefully organized and
structured practices having a long history of development in their own
right.

None of our experiences and none of our reflections about them

occur in a vacuum; they are always understood in terms of various
relationships, associations, communities and, inevitably, cultural
perspectives.

Therefore, even when a person has an experience when no

one else is present, her experiencing and her understanding of it are
imbued with and filtered through communal frameworks.
Hence, an obligation to respect a person's autonomy requires more
than a formal, abstract recognition that individuals, by virtue of being
persons, have a right to make their own decisions; i.e., ought to be, in
some sense, left alone, unhampered.

It also requires an appreciation of

the role that a person's numerous connections to her community play in
determining how effectively she will be able to realize that autonomy
as, for example, in actualizing her capacity for decision-making.
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This is why doing nothing more than formally recognizing the
abstract legal rights of persons who have suffered, for example, racial
or sexual discrimination is not simply ineffectual but often
counterproductive.

It is why concrete measures must also be introduced

to redress inequities existing in both formal social institutions and
informal social practices that have been ingrained by past
insensitivities, as well as the long-term effects of these on the
individual and collective psyches.

It may be, relatively speaking, a

straight-forward process to change the policies of a political
institution.

It takes far longer to change the effects that the

political enculturation of a policy has had on the daily lives of
persons, because such a change must address causal processes in the
formation of persons, identities, concepts and behaviors that are far
more complex, but just as important.
So, to respect formal autonomy without, for example, securing
equitable access to the effective means of its realization--i.e.,
without making it a lived experience for all persons--fails to respect
persons precisely because it ignores the interdependent play of
bio/psycho/social antecedents and consequents that determines in actual
practice what autonomy will effectively amount to for persons.

Just as

the ability to distinguish self from non-self emerges slowly as a person
begins to experience having a life--thanks to, among other factors, the
assistance and support of others who provide a safe space within which
to develop those experiences--so effectively expressing and maximally
benefitting from genuinely autonomous behavior develops in the context
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of intelligent (i.e., critical and reflective) interreactions between
persons.

Obviously, a health care ethics--or a system of ethics of any

sort--that is built on a concept of autonomy that ignores these
realities about what it is to be a person will overlook much of ethical
significance.
Beneficence and Non-Maleficence as Bio/psycho/social Concepts

On the view espoused by the standard approach to health care ethics
examined earlier in chapter two, beneficence and non-maleficence are
regarded as principles that regulate conduct towards persons as isolated
subjects deserving of 'respect,' a notion that, in turn, is based on an
inexplicit and quite narrow intuition as to the characteristics of
personhood.

On the reconstructed view of persons as bio/psycho/social

entities, beneficence and non-maleficence cannot be regarded simply as
forms of substituted autonomy, with 'autonomy' referring to the
decisions and actions of isolated, individual selves.

Something much

richer and, in terms of obligations and relationships, something much
more complex is needed.
Clearly, persons cannot begin to develop their individual talents
and characters--much less contribute or participate in a common life-without the beneficence and non-maleficence of others.

But this is only

to re-iterate that persons begin as completely helpless selves, unable
to survive without a community of others willing and able to protect
them from harm and suffering, to provide for their basic needs and to
act as their mentors.a
Parenthetically, the term, 'mentor,' has specifically been chosen
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here as a contrast to the usual structured educative relationships in
which teachers actively convey information that learners relatively
passively absorb.

Learning (both formal and informal) is too often

viewed as a one-way process, from teacher to learner, and where the
purpose of having the learner respond is primarily to verify that the
information has been absorbed.

But in such a process, students do not

learn how to think but only, if anything, what to think--which is then
treated as a set of facts or as the product of someone else's inquiries.
In mentoring, as the term is used here, all parties are actively
engaged; all contribute to the process, which is not confined to a
particular time, place or structure.
Consequently, in mentoring everyone is both teacher and learner
and, in the communication that results, listening becomes the
quintessential feature of the process.

Such 'listening' involves more

than simply a passive registering of isolated facts communicated by
another; rather, it requires of the listener the curiosity and
imagination to set aside his own particular situation and perspective
and to enter into the situation and perspective of the speaker,
representing her perspective with as much fidelity as possible.

A very

important part of decision-making involves learning how to represent
alternatives with charity and fidelity.
Even after persons have developed sufficiently to exhibit
decisional capacity or, further, to be considered legally competent,
they remain immersed and continue to participate in, by means of and
with an environment that is interdependent through and through.

Unless
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a person's life is suddenly and unexpectedly cut short, it is ordinarily
the case that, as persons age, their dependence upon others--to help
them meet those basic needs necessary for them to continue to carry out
their routine daily affairs, to pursue their life plans and goals and to
participate in and with the environment they share--will eventually,
once again, increase.
But, perhaps most importantly, beneficence and non-maleficence can
no longer be treated as attitudes and activities directed solely towards
others.

Certainly, this is not to deny the importance of being

sensitive to or concerned about the good of others or their potential
harm.

Rather, it marks the fact that behaving beneficently or non-

maleficently makes us feel alive and in control of our own lives: we are
most likely to discover who we are--sometimes to our dismay--during
those interreactions where our interests and concerns are directed
towards others.

This discovery is a characteristic feature of persons;

it is one of the fulfillments of potential that, through critical
reflection, self-assessment, and personal growth and development,
persons are capable of realizing.
Since, as with any interreactions that involve persons, the
responses of the social environment to a person's behavior will play an
important role in the development of the person whose behavior it is,
feedback (non-verbal as well as verbal) communicated by others will
reinforce the development of attitudes and patterns of behavior that
eventually come to characterize a person's unique sense of self.
guided by thoughtful and whole-hearted critical reflection, this

When
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feedback between persons (whether intimates or complete strangers)
constitutes a life-long, reciprocal mentoring process of listening,
communication and growth, a process necessary for the perpetuation of
persons as individuals who are members of various forms of community, a
process not unlike Dewey's notion of democracy:
that form of social organization, extending to all the areas and
ways of living, in which the powers of individuals shall not be
merely released from mechanical external constraint but shall be
fed, sustained and directed. 9
In other words, the transformation of examples of beneficent and nonmaleficent behavior (just like the transformation of examples of
autonomous or just behavior) into free-standing principles to be applied
to a problematic situation does not improve the human condition, but
merely substitutes a "new kind of enslavement," 10 one that restricts the
development of intelligent inquiry, discussion and expression to a predetermined path.

As alluded to in chapter two, principles ought to be

regarded not as restrictions, but as tools, suggested by past conditions
and regarded as potential means for addressing current conditions.
Obviously, a health care ethics--or an ethical system of any sort--that
is built on concepts of beneficence and non-maleficence that are
regarded solely (or, at least, predominantly) as externally-applied
principles that stipulate practice ignores the realities and seriously
underestimates the potentialities of our lived experience.

Chapter five

will examine the cases presented in chapter two from this reconstructed
view of beneficence and non-maleficence.
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Justice as a Bio/psycho/social Concept

There is an ancient Chinese parable that describes heaven and hell
as being precisely the same: each is a huge banquet with sumptuous foods
placed on round tables.

Each person is seated at one of the round

tables and given a pair of chopsticks five feet long.

In hell, everyone

struggles in isolation trying to eat with his own set of chopsticks and
eventually starves to death.

In heaven, everyone uses his own set of

chopsticks to serve the person directly across the table from him and no
one goes hungry.
According to the parable, heaven and hell will not be different
from the rest of our experiences: they will be what we choose--and/or
are led--to make of them.

If each person assumes the habit of treating

experiences as phenomena that are undergone privately and as the
property of an isolated individual self, then developing solutions to
problems that are experienced becomes the responsibility of the lone
experiencer.

On this view, whether individuals seek external

consultation with others or not, they are expected and expect themselves
to solve 'their own' problems; as a result, the possibilities that the
transformative effects of interdependent and cooperative action can have
on both means and ends will remain hidden from view and, thus,
undeveloped.
According to conceptions of justice that presuppose persons to be
isolated units of self-determination, then, the persons in hell were
treated equally and the persons in heaven were treated equally, so both
situations are equally just.

The effectiveness of the parable lies in
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its identification of such a conception of equality with hell rather
than heaven, because it ignores important bio/psycho/social aspects
central to being a person, which includes having a life that is
simultaneously characterized by dependence upon and responsibility for
others.
On the reconstructed view of persons as bio/psycho/social entities
being proposed here, however, the idea of justice is not easily captured
by its usual formal expression as the principle that equals are to be
treated equally, for the view of persons being defended here makes much
of the fact that individuals have unique strengths and weaknesses.

When

entities, because of their particular interrelationships with their
environments, have developed unique characteristics, there is an
important sense in which simply treating them equally falls short of
recognizing them for what they are.
Nor is the idea of justice more clearly captured by its usual
material (as opposed to formal) expression, i.e., that treatment or
distribution is to be equal unless morally decisive reasons can be given
for unequal treatment or distribution--at least not until the historical
context of the social antecedents that determines the bases for
distribution is clearly understood and accepted as reasonable and fair.
For example, the original intent of public education was to distribute
social goods (in this instance, information and knowledgeable teachers)
equally.

However, when the bulk of funding for each public school site

is tied to the revenues generated by the real estate taxes in that
particular district, the resulting discrepancy in funding that develops
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between rich and poor sections of a community is anything but equal.
Yet, everyone in the poor districts is treated equally (badly) and
everyone in the rich districts is treated equally.

In other words, our

concept of justice is deeply dependent on the concept of person upon
which it is built, and inadequacies in the latter carry over directly as
inadequacies in the former.
The Chinese parable captures an important aspect of justice that
the conceptions employed in the standard approach ('conceptions' because
there are a variety of formulations employed within the approach, all
resting on the same set of presuppositions) either miss or consider
peripheral to its central features: the possibility of solidarity.

On

the view being proposed here, seeking justice for oneself must begin
with being sensitive to one's interrelationships with one's
environmental field and, especially, to the needs of others, since it is
in the mutually defining features of this fundamental interrelationship
that the notion of justice gains concrete substance.

However, this can

occur only through communication and participation of persons in
unhampered, thoughtful and intelligently directed inquiry.

The thrust of

such an inquiry is to determine what they, as a community of sentient,
rational beings with unique perspectives to offer, would collaboratively
choose as a reasonable solution to their common problem, given the
possibilities available to them due to the constraints of their
particular context.
A health care ethics--or a system of ethics of any kind--that
regards justice solely as a formal principle, that stipulates only what
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is owed persons by virtue of their status as autonomous individuals,
ignores a central fact: that what counts as justice is neither timeless
nor axiomatic, but an attempt to make explicit the implicit norms of our
common, and frequently conflicting expectations and actual practices
through intelligent inquiry, which includes the social practice of
asking and giving reasons.

In chapter five, the cases discussed in

chapter two will be re-examined from this reconstructed view of justice.
Characterizing The Ethical Through Bio/psycho/social Context

Throughout this work, I have implicitly and explicitly appealed to
context as elemental for understanding the origin and nature of ethical
obligation between persons.
se.

There is nothing novel to this appeal, per

Certainly, an integral part of modern medical inquiry has always

been the individual patient's story.

Diagnosis requires not only

specialized theoretical knowledge and general expertise, but a specific
patient's story.

Thus, there is something important that the field of

health care has provided the field of ethics: an understanding of the
importance of performing, as it were, ethical diagnoses and ethical
autopsies--an emphasis in assessing alternative approaches to ethical
inquiry that attends better to the particular and concrete in
problematic cases by means of stories--negative as well as positive
ones.
The patient's story--like every story--is the product of an
intersubjective process and has an objective status in the sense that it
is as real as the patient whose story it is.

Included in that story is

a history, a physical, a differential diagnosis, a set of possible
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prognoses (from best- to worst-case scenarios) and a range of treatment
alternatives.

The patient evolves and narrates a history.

This

personal history is corroborated or refuted by family, friends and
physical findings.

The very fact that such a history can come together

about a person and can be communicated and argued about is itself yet
another example of the bio/psycho/social context of ethical reflection.
In the health care setting, the physicians' and other care-givers'
observations and examinations of and their interactions with the patient
generate physical findings.

The care-givers' assessment of the physical

findings and their own specialized knowledge and expertise, in
conjunction with the patient's history, generates a diagnosis and a
prognosis.

The range of treatment alternatives is a joint production of

care-givers (based on their expertise) and social institutions (based on
their responsibility for deciding which goods and services will be made
available for distribution and how they will be distributed).

At every

point along the way, there is (ideally) a process of collaboration and
negotiation between care-givers and patient (or her designated
representative) that facilitates the resolution of the problematic
aspects of the story without closing its consequences off to further reassessment.
It comes as no great surprise that 'telling a story' is so very
successful as a method of ethical education and development for persons
from childhood on up.

For the great stories of our cultural heritages

provide descriptions of and commentaries on tacit as well as explicit
communal frameworks within which occur the negotiation and development
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of what come to be considered ethically significant features of
experience.

They provide a setting within which we can identify,

compare, contrast, imaginatively test, evaluate and discuss what have
come to be considered ideals, principles, values and virtues within our
associations and communities--and to what purpose.
Being confronted with, for example, the Greek tragedies challenges
us as individuals to re-examine, set aside, defend or discard any
particular point of view (whether personal or cultural) by forcing us
imaginatively to experience the story from a multiplicity of often-times
competing perspectives.

Such stories enrich us in a way that fulfills

our need "to see the world whole."

They provide us with the

opportunity, in a leisurely and safe setting, to pursue alternatives by
imaginative rehearsal without actually suffering the consequences.

In

describing the immense value which great works of literature have for
us, Lorraine Code eloquently reminds us:
Novels may not give us moral knowledge directly and unequivocally,
but they often show us ways of placing moral points of view in
possible human situations. They illustrate some of the
perplexities and implications of putting moral theories into
practice so that one can see the importance of certain stances and
understanding something of why they will or will not, should or
should not work. 11
The patient/care-giver relationship can be aptly viewed as a story
that evolves out of multiple perspectives or points of view.

Every step

of the way in the development of the patient's story there are
individuals and disciplines registering and communicating their 'take'
on circumscribed aspects of the story.

This notion of the narrative

processing of events--the creative envisioning which occurs within the
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context of one's knowledge and understanding of one's larger b10-psychosocial possibilities--is, in large part, what makes it possible for
persons to understand themselves as beings who have lives.
In addition, attending to the narrative processing of events in any
story forces us to recognize that having a point of view is an integral
feature of having a life and to realize that others may have points of
view that are startlingly different from our own.

This is especially

true in health care cases, where life and death issues are often so
vividly drawn and contested.
Taking a perspective different from one's own, seeing how it
enhances or diminishes what one claims to value from one's own
perspective, is at once humbling and enriching.

But, more importantly,

it is to engage in behavior that is characteristically ethical.

It

requires one to engage in representing perspectives other than one's own
in the most charitable of terms possible while defending one's own
perspective with the most compelling good reasons one can muster.

Being

able to see an issue from a multiplicity of perspectives is the
intellectual tool by which all inquiries (ethical, scientific or
otherwise) are progressively refined and advanced; but it is the
reflective activity itself, the element of reflective inquiry or
intelligence, that is most distinctively called 'moral.'
According to Martha Nussbaum the real task of moral philosophy is
"to make a fine artistic creation'' of the 'raw' material of
experience. 12

This 'fine artistic creation' is at once a continuous

process and product of persons.

It is a bio/psycho/social activity
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because it is the result of the dynamic interrelations between a certain
kind of organism, a person, and its environment.

While the 'artist'

produces her 'product' in the first person singular, she is nevertheless
an 'artist' only by virtue of being a participant in a set of
intelligently constructed and directed social practices that occur
within a particular physical environment.

Between the artist, the

artistic community and the wider community there is--both tacitly and
explicitly--a continuous intellectual dialogue and narrative that
reflects the negotiation involved in the very meaning of what it is to
make 'a fine artistic creation.'

So everyone who engages attentively in

concrete moral reflection, Nussbaum is saying, is likewise striving to
be an artist in this sense.
Medicine is also an art--but it is an art predicated on the
sciences.

In our culture, a dichotomy between art and science is widely

accepted; but, as chapter three explained, Dewey rejected such deep
dichotomies between the varieties of reflective inquiry.

Science,

perceptively understood, is the result of the dynamic interrelations
between a certain kind of organism and its environment, it is
bio/psycho/social through and through.

This is the reason, this one not

yet well examined, that the scientific and artistic elements of medical
practice are not at constant war, because their deepest roots are,
ideally, one and the same.

And this is also why ethical inquiry need

not be at war with the scientific side of health care practice.
Good outcomes in health care cannot be reduced to physiological
statistics simply by virtue of the fact that treating patients
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presupposes quantitative laboratory data; but a proper bio/psycho/social
understanding of science offers no basis for such a reductive conclusion
in the first place.

Reflecting about ethical issues in health care

encounters requires understanding pathophysiology, psychology and
sociology; but this does not mean that ethics or philosophical
reflection about it can be exhausted by, reduced to or passively read
off of these sciences.
Ethical reflection within the health care setting calls on
scientists at work there to remember the bio/psycho/social grounds of
their forms of reflective inquiry.

In a parallel way, ethical analysis

in the field of health care calls the fields of ethics and philosophy to
remember that reflective inquiry--the sine qua non of ethics and
philosophy--because it is a characteristic of persons, is a never-ending
piecemeal project that represents the activity of a particular sort of
organism's dynamic interreation with its environment.
An approach to ethics which ignores these considerations is one
which, in the real world, lacks flexibility and leads to premature
closure: premature, not in the sense that all data necessary to a
particular case's disposition have not been gathered and sufficiently
scrutinized, but premature in the sense that the totality of the whole
problem as it extends into the future can no longer be viewed
dynamically.

In other words, a 'solution' can become reified and made

to serve as a fixed solution to future problems rather than as a
springboard to further exploration of a complex and dynamic issue.

When

this occurs, principles such as autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence
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and justice are treated as isolated set pieces to be externally applied
to problems rather than as elements of on-going reflection already part
of an indeterminate situation.
Adopting a bio/psycho/social view of ethical reflection requires us
to look at persons and their problems as part and parcel of a more
extensive project.

This project aims not at closure but at seeking to

bring about a pragmatic 'end-in-view'--i.e., a temporary end that serves
to deal with an immediate problem--as a means towards further reflective
inquiry, learning and intellectual growth for the future.

In such a

view of ethical reflection, resolutions are means to further inquiry
that will be made necessary by the dynamic bio/psycho/social network or
field in which persons are embedded.

That is, the persons, the data (of

which principles and all the fruits of previous ethical reflection are
but a part) and the environmental context (of which each community as it
is at any given moment is a part) in which such problem-solving occurs
are dynamically interactive.

Even though the resolutions may, across

cases at different times, be the same, problems are still not to be
considered merely as challenges met, once and for all.
The approach offered here looks at each problem and its resolution
as always at once both ad hoc resolving of an indeterminancy and
indicative of a larger challenge in progress which can only be 'met' in
the same way: progressively.

Such an approach is far more flexible and

adaptive to the needs of persons as we actually find them because it
allows for change, is open to the new data that the reflective life
reveals and, therefore, actively seeks to re-examine prior decisions in
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the light of changing circumstance.
Describing the approach without solidifying it into an algorithm is
challenging.

Before saying any more about it--both for clarity's sake

and because this is what the approach itself requires--the three cases
examined in chapter two will now be re-examined.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RE-ASSESSING THE CASES PRESENTED IN CHAPTER TWO
FROM A BIO/PSYCHO/SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction

Besides the significant differences that will result from the
reconstruction of personhood articulated in the preceding chapter, the
alternative approach to case analysis offered here also differs in
several respects from the one used to represent the standard approach in
chapter two.

This alternative also investigates the respective

biological, psychological and social aspects of the cases.

It does so

by attempting to incorporate as many perspectives of the relationship as
possible--in time (i.e., past, present and future) as well as in place
(i.e., from the individual perspective of each person or designated
representative).

That is, this approach borrows the Socratic strategy

of participatory discourse (without the metaphysical baggage of Platonic
essentialism) described in chapter one, and has every one of the
participants (or designated representatives) involved in the case ask
and answer the three questions: "Where have you come from'?"
you going'?"

"Where are

"How do we get there'?"

This process (both the asking and the answering), is personal
insofar as it is performed by each person who is party to the
relationship.

But it is also p_ublic insofar as communication renders it
111
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accessible to and, thus, challengeable by all involved in the
relationship.

Somewhat similar to the manner in which Thomasma and

Pellegrino make explicit the plurality of 'goods' involved in
patient/provider encounters, 1 so this alternative approach attempts to
render intelligible the even wider plurality of inexplicit, and
oftentimes conflicting, interrelated interests that are involved in
health care encounters.

This is a crucial part of the approach, since

it is only insofar as hidden, half-formed and, as yet, uncritically
entertained intuitions are explicitly confronted and subjected to
critical, public scrutiny that their coherence and consistency (or lack
thereof) become evident.
In other words, the process itself--as well as its potential means
and ends--is also not simply open to collaborative inquiry, but requires
it.

Moreover, in addition, the alternative approach offered here relies

on a strategy that differs from the the standard approach in that it
tends to represent the issues of health care ethics cases as complex
problems having a multiplicity of indeterminate features and
ambiguities, whereas the standard approach often regards them as
conflicts between a small number of competing, mutually exclusive
solutions that are to be compared from some generic, disinterested
perspective.

Therefore, in this approach, much of the work of

resolution in these cases depends upon the careful sorting out of a
whole set of ancillary problems associated with how to proceed in the
face of the indeterminate features and ambiguities of each particular
case.
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At this juncture, several things need to be stressed.

First, the

fact that it is impossible for all parties to an encounter to discover
everything about each other's history does not mean that the attempt to
do so is either misguided or futile.

Persons cannot recognize, assess

or appreciate each other's strengths, weaknesses, wants and needs simply
by privately assuming things about one another; so they must consciously
try to do so, even though their efforts are fallible and often
incomplete.

Second, critics of this alternative approach may complain

that, in the real world, no one has time to make explicit all of the
myriad assumptions persons have to make in order to get on with their
daily lives.

But if what is desired by persons is to have lives (bios,

not merely zoe) and to address the indeterminacy of living and make life
less indeterminate, then a critical part of accomplishing these things
requires more of the kind of preventive strategic brainstorming
characteristic of the participatory reflective inquiry espoused by this
alternative approach.
The first question, "Where have you come from'?" describes the
biographical lives of the persons actively involved in a case.

This

bio/psycho/social history needs to be asked and answered as early as
possible in the health care relationship; ideally, before problematic
situations become crises.

This question is crucial insofar as it allows

the participants to anticipate the collaborative potential of the
relationship, allowing more time to arrange for an alternative
relationship that may better fit the expectations of those most
intimately affected.

114

Moreover, since the biographies of those involved in the health
care relationship do continue to evolve, the need to re-ask this first
question can always arise.

However, because it describes individual

sets of fairly established personal habits and interests, the
presumption is that the initial answers to this first question should
not be subject to abrupt changes without reasons that can be articulated
and understood even when they or their implications may be
controversial.
The second question, "Where are you going?" while shaped by history
and present circumstance, anticipates the viability and future
possibilities of the relationship by elucidating the goals, values and
expectations of each of the participants to the relationship in light of
the physical and technical limitations of the situation.

In the event

that any of the participants' goals, values or expectations cannot be
reconciled by consensus or reasonable compromise, the second question
illuminates the limitations--perhaps even the non-viability--of the
relationship as heretofore conceived and the need for seeking an
alternative.
Moreover, as the membership of the relationship may change and the
medical condition of the patient and the other personae will evolve over
the course of time, so the answer to this second question will also
evolve over time.

Therefore, this question needs frequent re-asking and

re-answering, especially whenever the patient's medical condition
changes, but also simply whenever any of the participants to the
relationship have reason to believe that a re-assessment is warranted.
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The third question, "How do we get there?" presupposes that a great
deal of the necessary consensus and compromise entailed by the
constraints of the first two questions has already been accomplished.
However, there is still much information to share, learn, discuss and
re-assess on a continuing basis.

So, how the third question is asked

and answered will be prompted by and may, in turn, prompt re-assessment
of the other two questions.
This third question, because it deals predominantly with means,
presupposes the explicit as well as tacit involvement of the larger
community in ways that the first two questions do not, since the
technology often required is largely created, controlled and allocated
by the social institutions of the community.

This serves as a reminder

of the depth and intricacy of the bio/psycho/social interconnectedness
of what in the past has been regarded as, and still is too often
considered to be, a simple, dyadic patient/health care provider
relationship.

Even in the 'good old days,' this was an idealization

rarely, if ever, actualized.

As suggested in chapter one and argued

from a Deweyan perspective in chapter three, a central characteristic of
the process of intelligent inquiry, whether the subject matter is viewed
as science or morals, is openness to the challenge of re-asking, reentertaining and re-answering these three questions at any point along
the way.
Before returning to the three cases analysed in chapter two, some
further cautionary remarks are in order.

First, to reduce overlap and

undue repetition, those aspects of a case that remain unchanged from the
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first analysis to the second will simply be assumed without explicit
repetition.

Those aspects that are substantially changed, however, will

be clearly noted and their circumstances carefully established and
addressed.
Second, because we are not actually participants in these cases and
do not actually enter into them as they progress--i.e., we are only
thinking them through and not also undergoing them--these analyses
cannot go beyond the level of imaginative rehearsal.

That is, a central

aspect of the reconstruction of these cases is missing: namely, the
evolutionary modifications that develop in the course of the normal give
and take of actual participation in a case resolution.

However, given

the empiricist constraints of the method of science, this is not a
defect, but a characteristic of the enterprise.

Until these prospective

modifications actually occur and the breadth and depth of their effects
can be measured, assessed, compared with customary practice and
reviewed, there can be no hard evidence for or against their efficacy.
Given the track record of the experimental sciences as examples of
successful models of reflective inquiry, and so of this approach, one
can reasonably anticipate that, whatever prospective and preventive
strategies are used to resolve cases such as those examined here, if
they are to be consistent with a bio/psycho/social approach, they will
have to include critical scrutiny and revision of those social
institutions associated with health care so as to make them more
accessible and responsive to the persons they serve.
For the convenience of the reader, each of the following re-
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analyses will be prefaced by the case as it was originally presented in
chapter two.
Case Analyses
Case #1: The 'Rescue Medicine' Conundrum

During a recent cold winter an indigent, elderly man was
brought into a local emergency room with pneumonia. He was
close to starvation and suffered from hypothermia because he
could not afford to eat or heat his room after paying his
rent. While in the emergency room, the man suffered a cardiac
arrest. Three weeks after aggressive cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation and stabilization, he remained completely
unresponsive and totally dependent on a ventilator. During
this time social services discovered that the man had no
family or friends. The health care team suspected that the
patient would remain permanently comatose, and a neurological
consult confirmed the team's suspicion that the patient's
prognosis was bleak.
An ethicist was consulted to discuss whether it was
ethically appropriate to discontinue this man's treatment and
was told by the health care team that between $100,000 and
$200,000 had been expended treating this man. The members of
the health care team concurred that, had it been possible to
restore the patient to a semblance of his pre-hospitalization
condition (which it was not), they would have felt no qualms
about continuing such treatment--which would have, in effect,
returned this patient to the material conditions responsible
for his hospitalization in the first place.
Analysis

The analysis of this case in chapter two ended with the health care
team having decided to withdraw all of this patient's medical treatment
with the exception of comfort measures.

The reasoning behind this

decision was based on the assumption that this patient would not wish to
be sustained in a vegetative existence because most persons having the
opportunity to decide this issue in advance would not choose to be
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sustained in a vegetative state (which might explain the concern about
comfort measures for a patient in a vegetative existence).

On the basis

of this assumption it was argued that the principles of autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice would best be served, and the
values they represent best maximized by withdrawing all treatment except
comfort measures.
The account of individualism that is assumed in this reasoning and
implied in the standard approach, includes the presupposition that
respecting a person entails treating her--or, in this instance, him--as
an isolated, atomistic locus of rational self-determination and selfsufficiency.

The rationale behind this account appears to be as

follows: because certain characteristics are worthy of respect (e.g.,
rationality, self-determination, self-sufficiency), the class of
entities having those characteristics are, in turn, worthy of respect.
However, reliance on this account of individualism to justify treatment
decisions for patients in circumstances like those of this case is not
defensible since it is precisely these characteristics (along with
others) of personhood that are missing or seriously compromised in this
patient.

Hence, this account of individualism cannot adequately make

sense of the notion of ethical obligations in such a case.
For an account of individualism to be considered adequate, it must
take seriously the antecedent experiential context and conditions of
personhood.

That is, it must attend to the fact that the development of

a person's distinctive features--those characteristics that make her who
she is--is not the product of a lone, disinterested spectator, but a
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continuous and dynamic bio/psycho/social process, an active, dynamic
expression of that particular individual's interdependent relationships
with her environment.

The alternative approach advocated here espouses

the alternative, reconstructed account of individualism and its
implications.

Among other things, it enables us to make sense of why we

still feel the tug of ethical obligation to persons whose autonomy has
been seriously compromised insofar as it grounds the notion of ethical
obligation not in some independent criteria that define what it is to be
a person, but in the bio/psycho/social matrix of that individual's
existence as a person.
In other words, when an individual, such as the patient in this
case, permanently loses those characteristics that make it possible for
him to have a life, the ethical alternatives of those others connected
with his situation are not limited simply to speculating about what some
generic person would want when he is no longer capable of appreciating
his situation or making that choice.

Rather, in the event that a

patient cannot directly act or speak for himself, every attempt is made
to reconstruct his particular perspective and then to represent it with
as much accuracy and fidelity as possible.
That is why the ethical obligations of those involved in caring for
such a patient cannot be determined from applying a set of independently
derived principles.

Rather, every attempt must be made to reconstruct

that particular patient's story--his bio/psycho/social history, his
unique relationship with his environment.

This alternative account of

personhood, because it is committed to attempting such a reconstruction
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of the person's perspective, makes it possible to talk coherently about
ethical obligations to patients that, according to the standard
approach's account of individualism, are no longer rational, selfdetermined or self-sufficient.
Taking the bio/psycho/social matrix of ethical obligation seriously
also reinforces a particular kind of collaborative process that
distinguishes this alternative approach from the standard approach in a
very important respect; namely, it is a homeostatic collaborative
process.

That is to say, this process is not simply causal, nor simply

reactive, but homeostatic, insofar as the dynamic balance sought in this
particular kind of collaboration is one that promotes the integrity of
the whole by protecting the integrity of each of the individual elements
involved, and this includes the interrelationships that characterize
those individual elements.
Moreover, this homeostatic collaboration is guided by the Deweyan
notion of 'intelligence;' namely, it meets those requirements of
reflective inquiry discussed in chapter three: (1) active engagement,
(2) publicity, (3) an effort towards mutual understanding of and respect
for differences, (4) openness to the inevitability of modification or
change and (5) a willingness to allow ourselves to be led by the dynamic
of the inquiry rather than by pre-established interests and
expectations.

This notion of intelligence is quite different from a

process in which pre-established principles are applied (however
intelligently) algorithmically, analogous to how men are deployed
against one another in a game of chess, until one side or the other is
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victorious.
If this alternative account of individualism were incorporated into
ethical analyses of health care encounters, a corresponding change in
the scope, structure and function of professional codes and formal
statements about the primary goals and values of health care would also
follow.

The general focus of these formal ideals of health care

practice would still be to benefit individual patients.

However,

because 'patient' and 'benefit' would be more broadly construed, from
within a bio/psycho/social perspective, both theory and practice in
health care would be significantly altered.
In other words, because it enhances our understanding of how
profoundly the antecedent conditions of our current environment
(especially the social ones) influence what it is to be a person--to
have a life--this alternative account would (1) enable finer
distinctions to be drawn at the level of each particular case, (2) make
it easier to translate formal statements into effective guides to action
and (3) prompt the creation, interaction and evolution of the kinds of
social structures that can anticipate as well as respond to cases such
as this one.

As a result, our social institutions will be better

equipped to deal with such cases prospectively rather than merely
anterospectively.
Compare, for example, the items (listed on page 34) that are
traditionally included in formal statements about the primary goals and
values of the health care professions with the following list which, due
to the broader perspective suggested by this alternative approach,
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represents a difference in emphasis as well as scope:
1.

promoting health through education

2.

relieving symptoms, pain and, when possible, suffering

3.

maintaining and improving function or minimizing its
deterioration

4.

avoiding exposure of patients to gratuitous harm or
unnecessary risk

5.

curing (as opposed to merely prolonging biological life)
whenever possible

6.

providing comfort measures and/or orchestrating death when
curing or maintaining functional life is precluded

Obviously, these items, like those originally listed on page 34, may
differ in emphasis or ranking, depending upon the particular case at
issue.

However, it should be noticed that, in making explicit the

differences in the antecedent and consequent elements between having a
life and Q~~:i,_flg alive, the alternative bio/psycho/social approach changes
the focus of these primary goals and values from one that is merely
reactionary to one that is critical and prospective.
As a result, rather than being required to respond to a series of
events that they had no hand in creating, the persons involved are in a
better position to guide rather than only be guided by events.

Instead

of re-affirming the presumption that the primary role of care-givers and
patients alike requires them to react individually to aspects of the
encounter as though responding to a series of isolated and immediate
'givens,' this alternative approach requires the collaboration of both
patients and providers in anticipating, understanding and resolving
problematic elements of an encounter.

In other words, the alternative,
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bio/psycho/social approach considered here makes it possible for persons
to have lives--to become (or remain) subjects of their lives--in ways
that simply cannot be accomplished by (putative) lone individuals.
However, replacing a principlist applications model of problemsolving like the standard approach with a prospective and participatory
one, and moving therefore beyond a crisis management mode of
intervention to one that emphasizes prevention, entails the development
of a different set of practices between persons and a different set of
commitments and expectations between persons and their social
institutions than currently exists.

Hence, even more so than in the

other two cases still to be re-analysed, this particular case
illustrates how the alternative approach would reconstruct the way
health care-related social institutions currently function, in order to
prevent--or, at least, to minimize--the occurrence of such cases.

To

see the practical implications of this claim more clearly, it is helpful
to understand the limitations of current health care practice.
In current practice it is a commonplace that, once a person gains
access to health care services, the standard of that care is unaffected
by what are considered extraneous, i.e., non-medical, considerations,
and resources are frequently treated as if they were infinite.

The

delivery system of our health care institution has developed in such a
way as to insulate providers from patients in several important ways.
First, it insulates providers from persons and their lives until they
present either with discrete medical complaints or, less frequently,
with specific concerns for preventing illness and/or learning how to
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develop healthier lifestyles.

Second, it insulates providers from those

aspects of their patients' lives that are not considered relevant either
to the diagnosis and treatment of the immediate pathophysiological or
pathopsychological findings that prompted the patient to seek medical
care or to the patient's specific concerns with prevention and selfcare.
This insulation has unwittingly led to a number of difficulties,
the most notable being the change wrought in the health care providers'
focus of concern.

It has increasingly been diverted from patients as

persons having lives to patients as isolated sets of symptoms, and from
the on-going challenge of educating and engaging persons in their own
preventive and maintenance care (since even preventive care today is
usually in response to a crisis or feared crisis) to the time-slice
drama of rescue medicine, with its emphasis on crisis management and
need for expensive technology.
As a result, health care providers currently expend huge amounts of
time, effort and resources rescuing individuals from medical problems
that often are induced or exacerbated by the standing social
arrangements, sometimes even social arrangements that were instituted to
prevent or ameliorate some problem in the first place.

In other words,

many of the medical problems that health care providers must deal with
today exist as a consequence of trying to address causative factors of
social and psycho/social conditions as though they were themselves
independent of and, thus, incapable of affecting health and health care.
As exemplified in this case, involvement of health care providers
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too often is limited to a person's hospitalization for a very discrete,
but artificially isolated problem.

The providers in this case have been

insulated very effectively not only from the social roots of this
person's condition but also, for the most part, from the kind of
prospective collaboration with other social institutions that could
prevent or minimize the occurrence of just such cases as his.
Another major source of difficulty is the way that the standard
approach interprets health care providers' obligations in relation to
health care resources.

A commitment to fulfill the goals of health care

professionals as these are conventionally understood within the standard
approach presupposes unlimited access to the resources necessary to
provide that care.

The fact of the matter, of course, is that health

care resources have always been limited and, as our society is just
beginning to realize, could not be otherwise.

Therefore, that these

professionals experience ethical conflict is inevitable.

The goals and

guiding principles of health care providers are inconsistent with the
economic goals and intentions of the larger community; but there is
nothing in the standard approach to assist health care professionals in
resolving this conflict because its focus in practice is always limited
to the patient/practitioner relationship, and not that relationship's
larger psycho/social context.
As society now faces ever-increasing budgetary difficulties,
resources are being treated less cavalierly in the larger society and
health care is therefore becoming even more difficult to deliver.
Health care providers are also being asked to help conserve resources.
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They are being told that for too long they have been insulated from the
'real' world, the world of limited access and limited resources.
But to expect health care providers to act in the face of these
conflicting demands, each demand supported by arguments from the same
narrow set of principles, without at the same time actively
reconstructing the approach to ethical reflection that is being
undertaken, is to invite them to compromise their professional
commitments as hitherto construed by subordinating the needs of
individual patients to the economic interests of certain segments of
their society for the sake of expediency.

The introduction of the

concept and practice of managed care, for example, has only served to
heighten this conflict by placing care-givers, especially physicians, in
the position of weighing the health care needs of their patients
directly against their own economic well-being.
Unlike the alternative approach espoused here, the prevalent view
of the responsibility of health care providers to patients, like the
standard approach which grounds it, is not understood to include health
care professionals undertaking a prospective critique of the means and
ends of existing social institutions.

Nor is this responsibility

thought to include providing services that other social institutions
have failed to cover.

Echoing a long-standing view of human

relationships in our society, the health care professions' attitudes
have overwhelmingly been that their members' professional obligations
are limited to the symptomatic treatment of individual, identified
patients having specific, circumscribed complaints.
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Notice in this connection, for example, the language standardly
used to record a patient's complaint upon hospital admission: "This
patient presents with ... "

The health care team is 'presented' with an

already circumscribed and isolated problem.

While a patient's history

and physical is done to try to establish the reasons for the troubling
situation, routinely formulating the problem in this way biases the
inquiry.

That is, the health care providers are expected to identify

and to focus on correcting only those physiological antecedents directly
responsible for an isolated phenomenon and/or on counseling the patient
to modify personal habits contributing directly to it.

Therefore, their

efforts are antecedently structured to deal with these cases in
isolation from their contexts instead of helping the public, for
example, to recognize and to come to terms with the larger, more
extensive social roots of the ills these cases reveal.
This is why such problematic cases currently tend to be discussed
as though they were isolated phenomena to be resolved within a tightly
circumscribed context.

The antecedent conditions and potential

consequences of a case are considered relevant only as they directly
concern the patient at hand in his or her current condition or those
other persons (e.g., family members) actively and directly involved in
the case as it is presently being addressed.

As a result, the deeper,

underlying social antecedents and consequents of an issue are never
addressed because they are not even recognized as part of the problem.
Unless compelling reasons can be given to show that the
bio/psycho/social conditions of personhood, of having a life, can be
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safely be ignored, the ethical obligations of the health care team must
be reconstructed so that they extend beyond purely biological and
technical considerations to include the psycho/social.

In other words,

the presuppositions of the standard approach need to be reconstructed to
view health care as a socially situated response of socially situated
individuals, as an element of a continually problematic human world--but
also one that is, fortunately, always at least potentially correctable.
Once that reconstruction is properly undertaken, the nature of ethical
obligation as a situated response of any entity that is bound up in the
cooperative interrelationships and collaborative practices of having a
life will become clearer.
Though widely prevalent, the view of health care being criticized
here is not universal.

Many health care providers do recognize that

this sort of isolation and insulation is a falsification of the real
world.

They understand that fully addressing this patient's situation

in this case would require taking into account the social environment
this man comes from and its causal role in his medical condition, as
well as his understanding of the health care system and his
comprehension of his situation, etc.

They understand that their

commitment to patients requires concern for the environment people live
in and see the connection between their profession and social and
political action.
That is, even though such concerns are considered additional and
optional under the current view of the obligations of health care
professionals, there are, both recently and historically, important
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exceptions.

Health care providers, and physicians especially, have

found themselves at the forefront of social action, as activists
lobbying for social change, from nineteenth century public health
reforms 2 to organizing against nuclear war in this century. 3

The most

recent group of activist physicians--Medecin sans frontieres, translated
into English as "Doctors without Borders"--is French-based, but includes
physicians from all over the world.

The organization is dedicated to

providing temporary medical assistance in times of natural disasters,
wars and political or social upheavals.
What these individuals and groups have in common is a recognition
that social and political decisions apparently remote from health care
can place whole groups of persons at risk medically.

They have held and

currently hold that health care professionals have a vital role in
addressing the underlying problematic sources of these issues, not
simply patient-by-patient as direct health care providers, but
politically because of their status as experts in health care and the
special obligations that status confers.

Accordingly, there is

precedent for the claim that health care providers should understand
that their commitment to individual, identified patients requires
concern for and responsiveness to the social and political conditions
under which individuals become patients.

But, advocates of the standard

approach and of the conventional understanding of obligations of health
care professions have addressed this position almost not at all, much
less provided health care professionals with active guidance about how
it might be carried out.
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So, it is not surprising that the care-givers involved in the first
case were troubled.

It is likely that this patient was already in the

process of becoming socially abandoned long before his present medical
needs were significant and that the medical treatment he required when
he 'presented' was probably a direct result of that abandonment.

This

is deeply ironic since, just in monetary terms alone, the amount spent
for his hospitalization on this one occasion could have kept him--and a
number of others in similar straits--in rent, food and adequate heat for
well over the entire winter.

But the current presuppositions of the

larger social system permit his abandonment; and the standard approach
permits his medical needs and their treatment to be regarded as discrete
facts rather than integrally connected aspects of human life in a social
world because its presuppositions about persons and their lives shape
professional ethical thinking in precisely this way.
To re-iterate, then, the belief that the material conditions of
this man's existence outside of the contingent circumstances of his
hospitalization have no bearing on the health care team's ethical
obligations to patients precisely misses the point of who this patient
is and why he is where he is.

To understand this point is to challenge

the conception of the health care provider/patient relationship as
isolated person (or team of persons)-to-isolated person (or person plus
significant others), and to require, in its place, one that conceives of
each pole of this relationship as being situated much more richly and
meaningfully--and therefore, ambiguously--within a broad social context
that eventually includes, among other things, the entire institutional
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and societal distribution system.
While some conflict is inevitable in any society, it is certainly
not unrealistic to expect that social institutions and their access
(especially in a democracy) be restructured when they no longer serve as
effective means for empowering individuals in ways that also benefit and
strengthen the community as a whole.

However, this cannot occur so long

as these institutions are regarded merely as providers of isolated
services or products.

In reality, social agencies and institutions, at

their best, 'provide' only one thing: a communicative forum, an
intellectual space within which individuals can come together to arrange
ways in which they can prospectively share their strengths and thereby
minimize the effects of their weaknesses.

This means that, if problems

in health care are to be addressed, the opinions and advice of all sorts
of experts--in health care, philosophy, history, economics, psychology,
sociology, etc.--must be prospectively sought and disseminated to the
public, who can then intelligently participate in the discussion and
debate necessary to critique and to improve existing strategies for
resolving these problems.
Of course, individual health care providers might rightly fear in
this matter what could be called the 'slippery-slope of obligation.'

It

is a fear that, once involved in the resolution of psycho/social aspects
of specific cases, the flood-gates will be opened and there will be no
end to their responsibility for people.

Very possibly they would then

be diverted from effecting diagnosis, prognosis and treatment--matters
about which they have been trained--and they would become responsible
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for a host of psycho/social interventions that they are unskilled in
performing and for which they have been given no effective institutional
supports.

In truth, given the current structure of our social

institutions and the prevailing view of the responsibilities of health
care providers to patients, these fears are probably justified.

In this

country today, health care providers are trained--and rewarded--for
short-term, circumscribed and technically sophisticated medical rescue.
If the public's expectations about the range of rescue interventions
increases without an accompanying reconstruction of health care
professionals' obligations (and possibly preparation) and of how
relevant resources are allocated, etc.--then our society's health care
professionals will be caught in an even worse bind than the
bio/psycho/socially sensitive among them presently face.
There is no straight-forward way in this country's present health
care system for providers to counsel society to modify its habits,
institutions and ways of ethical thinking about patients and health
care.

In fact, the focus of most of our public health programs has been

almost exclusively to protect society from the spread of disease by
isolating the ill (e.g., victims of plague), establishing and monitoring
sanitation codes and overseeing inoculation programs. 4

In other words,

what are even recognized as legitimate social health care goals and
appropriate possible courses of action are similarly determined by the
presuppositions about persons, relationships and obligation on which
they rest.

So, the analysis and application of underlying intuitions--

even the reconstructed ones tentatively set out in chapter four--serve
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no effective purpose unless and until persons come together to devise
methods for identifying problems and coordinating the effective use of
our social resources and institutions towards their resolution.

In the

concluding section of this chapter, I will suggest a possible resolution
to this current, wide-spread lack.
Case #2: Medical Treatment For A Social Ill

A frail, elderly man without relatives or visitors has
lived in an extended care facility for the past five years.
While needing physical assistance with daily activities, such
as bathing and walking, he is oriented to time and place.
With increasing frequency over the past two years the
following pattern of behavior is observed: the patient
abruptly informs his health care providers that he will no
longer take fluids or food because he wants to die.
Within several days, the man becomes semi-comatose and is
sent to the nearest emergency room where he is re-hydrated by
means of intravenous fluids and/or naso-gastric intubation.
Upon recovery, he consistently expresses regret that he is
still alive and disappointment with his care-takers for having
over-ridden his wishes. The patient temporarily resumes
adequate consumption of fluids and food, only to repeat the
cycle in a few months' time.
Analysis

The analysis of this case in chapter two ended with the health care
team in the unenviable position of being forced to choose between 'the
lesser of two evils,' namely, continuing to send this patient, when he
becomes medically unstable and semi-comatose, to the emergency room to
be medically treated for his self-induced dehydration and starvation
and, in the interim, attempting to dissuade him from persisting in his
pattern of behavior.

The rationale behind this decision was derived

from an understanding of the criteria for decisional capacity based on
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the atomistic view of individualism espoused by the standard approach.
According to this perspective, the principles of autonomy, beneficence
and justice would best be served by respecting the patient's rationality
and self-determination until he becomes semi-comatose, at which point,
the primary injunction, 'do no harm,' would take precedence and the
care-givers would be bound by their professions' general interpretation
of the principle of non-maleficence.
Once again, insofar as the health care team regards the social
aspects of the case, especially the social disposition of elderly
patients who need mild to moderate physical assistance, they encounter
these aspects as ready-made and unchallengeable givens.

Most

communities are unable, unwilling or do not have reason to believe that
they are ethically obligated to commit social resources towards
developing feasible strategies to help make patients such as this man
feel included as a positively valued part of the community.

In such an

environment, there is no compelling reason for this man to believe that
he has an ethical obligation or any other good reason to stay alive.
Thus, the 'problem' for the care-givers and this patient is to a
significant degree pre-set by the community's patterns of actions and
beliefs, over which the principle agents in this case perceive
themselves to have little, if any, control.

The situation is thus

perceived as a conflict between the principle of autonomy (i.e., the
patient's) and the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence (i.e.,
the care-givers' pursuit of their professional goals).
In the analysis of this case in chapter two, it was noted that it
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may very well be possible for the care-givers to elicit from the patient
a coherent account of his behavior and that this should be attempted.
But more is needed.

The patient should not only be challenged to give

reasons for his behavior; but the care-givers ought also to call into
question the tacit attitudes and behavior of the community's treatment
of its indigent and physically impaired elderly.

That is, the

reconstructed approach proposed here requires the care-givers to examine
critically the social 'givens,' such as communities' obligations to
their older members, thereby allowing also the reconstruction of the
'problem' at hand from a broader truly bio/psycho/social perspective.
For example, the alternative approach could lead us to consider, on
the basis of its particular bio/psycho/social interpretation of
individualism, that the decisional capacity of this man has, in fact,
been impaired.

The reasoning might proceed as follows.

Based on the

five criteria described on page 39 of chapter two--i.e., understanding,
rationality, opportunity, absence from coercion and authenticity--this
man has not been adequately protected from an external form of coercion,
namely, intolerable environmental (i.e., social) conditions.

Because of

this, the authenticity of his decision and present pattern of behavior-a key element of autonomy--might be challenged.

However, in questioning

this man's decisional capacity in this manner, the care-givers must open
up therewith the possibility of questioning the social conditions
responsible for creating the external coercion leading to this man's
psychological disposition.

That is, once the broader perspective is

taken, the caregivers cannot then return to the standard approach, and
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its focus on individual decision-making at that point.
But, again, what this approach rests on is the development of a
different set of presuppositions about persons and a different way of
framing norms, practices, commitments, expectations and reciprocity
between individuals and the social institutions they create.

And, doing

so, again, requires replacing a reactionary applications model of
medical and ethical problem-solving with one that is participatory,
prospective and able to move beyond a crisis mode to one of prevention.
A first step in the transformation of the way in which health care
institutions currently function might be to create a variety of
interdisciplinary deliberative and advisory bodies.

These bodies or

councils would function as a communicative bridge between the various
social institutions, professional experts and the public, making
possible a continuous, prospective monitoring and critique of the
strengths and weaknesses of the available services of existing social
institutions and of the presence or absence of a healthy variety of
strategies for their access by the community's members.
Just how this step might transform the options of a patient like
the one in the present case is only hypothetical, because these are not
alternatives actually offered in this particular case.

So until these

prospective modifications are actually tried--in the going and its
consequences as opposed to the necessary, but still merely preliminary
speculative brainstorming--and the extent of their effects are measured,
assessed and compared to what we would hope to achieve, their efficacy
will remain an open question.

However, this alternative approach to
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addressing the case, takes better account of its b10/psycho/sucial
realities and requires us to keep searching for practical ways to
respect these bio/psycho/social realities in the actions we take.

This

approach, by keeping the antecedents and consequents of issues open to
potential inquiry, prevents the resolutions of specific cases from
becoming reified and regarded as a variety of standard practice that is
so fixed that it is immune to future, critical examination and revision.
Case #3: Hyperacute Rejection Syndrome

A 26 year old woman developed myocarditis (a severely
damaging inflammation of the heart which interferes with the
ability of the heart to pump blood efficiently) during an
otherwise unremarkable pregnancy. Although she eventually
delivered a premature but viable and healthy infant, the
patient's own cardiac function deteriorated to the point where
a transplant was the only remaining chance for saving her
life. After delivery, a properly matched donor heart
eventually became available and she underwent a
transplantation that involved no immediate complications.
Several hours post-transplant and while still in the
recovery room, the patient's cardiac function rapidly began to
deteriorate. It was apparent that she was experiencing a
'hyperacute rejection' (a process of organ transplant
rejection whose etiology is poorly understood and which in
about 95% of cases leads to repeat rejection should another
transplant be attempted). The patient was placed on
mechanical pump support as the newly transplanted heart could
no longer provide the pumping action required to keep the
patient alive. While she is currently awake, able to speak
and rational, the mechanical pump is, at its present stage of
technological development, only a stop-gap measure.
Therefore, if this patient does not receive another heart
transplant, she will die.
When a heart which is a good match for this patient
finally becomes available, it also happens to be an equally
good match for another potential recipient who is awaiting
transplant for the first time. The hospital ethics committee
is asked whether the transplant team should re-transplant this
patient or give the heart to the other waiting candidate.
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Analysis

The analysis of this case in chapter two ended with the transplant
team in the unenviable position of having to choose between a number of
conflicting ethical obligations: (1) to the patient with hyperacute
rejection syndrome, (2) to the other potential first-time recipient (who
has a significantly greater chance of survival), (3) to their profession
and (4) to the community.

After weighing the implications of what the

principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice seemed
to require, the care-givers decided that, all things considered,
offering re-transplantation to the patient with hyperacute rejection
syndrome was the most compelling of their obligations.

The rationale

behind the decision was based on a utilitarian argument that their
decision would, overall, preserve the greatest number of interests and
values that these conflicting principles are said to under-write.
However, once again, the care-givers involved in this case are
presented with a set of conflicting social expectations arising from
social structures the majority of which they have no available
mechanisms for challenging.

In today's understanding of the transplant

team/patient relationship and through the institutions that embody that
understanding, the team is virtually compelled to re-transplant the
patient with hyperacute rejection.

On the other hand, it is the

community's tacit assumption that the proper role of health care
professionals includes gate-keeping at the bedside, in which care-givers
are expected to be responsible for efficient resource allocation at the
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bed-side on a case-by-case basis.

Clearly there is a clash of

principles at work here and present thinking includes no 'superprinciple,' no fixed precedence principle that can be applied in the
event that principles conflict.
Obviously, in any scenario where scarce resources require the
adoption of some kind of distribution scheme, gate-keeping must occur.
However, for a distribution scheme to have any degree of accuracy,
effectiveness and equity, it is necessary for the person or group of
persons responsible for the distribution to have the same general
relationship with and obligations to all of the potential beneficiaries.
While the input of a care-giver's information from the bedside is
necessary for data accumulation needed for distribution, it is not
sufficient for making the care-giver an appropriate distributor of
scarce resources at the bedside.

Thus, while care-givers, by virtue of

their special expertise, have an obligation to serve as technical
advisors to the community, they cannot, by virtue of their special
relationships with identified patients, be expected to act
simultaneously as gate-keepers.

Someone or some group representing all

the potential beneficiaries must perform this role.
It is the case that, whenever a person applies a principle, follows
a rule, assumes a role, etc., she is tacitly endorsing the commitments
implied by those activities.

That is, a care-giver's participation in

gate-keeping at the bedside implies that she accepts this practice as
one of her legitimate roles and, accordingly, will assume responsibility
for the consequences of her actions.

The fact that she recognizes that
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there is a conflict of interests and principles occurring signals the
beginning of critical, reflective thought.

Pitting each interest and

principle against one another and weighing the consequences without
attempting to subject the implications of the particular antecedents and
consequents of the case to careful scrutiny prevents controlled inquiry
and replaces it with the ethical equivalent of following the path of
least resistance.
Accordingly, as has been argued in the previous two cases, it is
crucial that care-givers have recourse to some mechanism by which they
can challenge the ethical appropriateness and validity of society's
demands upon them respecting this issue.

Rather than presenting them

with a fait accompli that ends inquiry and requires them to engage in a
post hoc justification of their actions, a bio/psycho/social approach
opens the possibility of questioning the 'givens' and of making explicit
the implicit--and often contradictory--presuppositions behind social
aspects of cases, aspects that are tacitly accepted and endorsed social
practices.
In the immediacy of any particular patient's crisis, of course,
there is no time to put a broad socially responsible decision-making
process in place to determine the proper use of scarce transplant
resources.

But that only means that health care providers who strive to

do their ethical reflection on the basis of bio/psycho/social
presuppositions, rather than the standard approach, must begin well in
advance of such crises--must begin now--to critique and seek
modification of institutional structures and practices that foreclose
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the full actualization of the possibilities this approach reveals.

The Ethics Committee: Solution or Further Symptom?

One response to the present ethical difficulties facing
patient/health care provider relationships is the ethics committee.
Historically such committees have been constituted by individual health
care facilities to help their staff, their patients and a very
circumscribed local community to make better informed decisions about
the specific health care options offered by that facility.

But, there

is evidence to suggest that ethics committees, when properly organized
and prepared, are also eminently suited to provide the sort of forum in
which disparately functioning social institutions can be coordinated to
benefit maximally both health care as a social institution as well as
the public it serves. 5
However, the majority of ethics committees currently functioning in
this country are ham-strung by the same sorts of difficulties already
described as burdening and limiting health care teams and individual
health care: isolation, insulation, being co-opted by special interests
and, most importantly, being confronted with piece-meal, ready-made
problems that individually need resolution on an emergency basis.

That

is, they face the same sort of faits accomplis that are so
detrimental to the effectiveness of social institutions in general and
health care professionals in particular.
This difficulty is made most evident when we compare an
idealization of the most effective ethics committee with the way in
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which most ethics committees currently function.

Ideally speaking an

ethics committee has three functions: education, policy consultation and
case consultation (listed in order of importance).

More specifically,

these functions can be described as including:
1.

education: in the course of educating itself, it also educates
health care staff, patient/clients, their significant others
and the community at large about ethical issues in general as
well as those specifically affecting the relationships between
the facility and its community of staff and patients/clients

2.

policy consultation: it assists with institutional policy
review by helping to develop, review and up-date the
facility's health care policies

3.

case consultation: it provides expertise and support for
health care staff, patient/clients and their significant
others in health care decision-making by helping all of the
parties concerned to develop the insight necessary to identify
and analyse aspects of individual cases that have become
ethically troubling and to suggest strategies for their
resolution

Though our experience with ethics committees is limited, it still
suggests that, when these responsibilities are conscientiously met, in
this particular order of importance, a committee's ability to devise
preventive strategies actually succeeds within the institution and
minimizes the need to devise reactionary or defensive strategies for the
constant, superficial and purely symptomatic treatment of full-blown
ethical conflicts and dilemmas.

That is, when the first two functions

are adequately met, the third function requires a relatively little
investment of time and effort.

When the last responsibility is the only

one emphasized--which is often the case with many existing ethics
committees--it becomes impossible for a committee to control inquiry
sufficiently to provide anything more substantial than temporary, piece-
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meal and already polarized, standard approach-based solutions to
problems already 'given.'

Ethics committees that choose to deal only

with the last function never have the time to get beyond it to deal with
the first two functions, the only preventive strategies that have a
chance of effectively dealing with ethical issues prospectively and
resolving specific, concrete cases via controlled, systematic and
progressive inquiry.
Every effort must be made to avoid this situation since, as I have
argued, the problem as 'given' is outside of controlled inquiry insofar
as it offers no guarantee of an adequate assessment of the roots of an
issue.

That is, even though ethics committees can potentially play the

important role of responsible decision-making described in the previous
section, they are often not able to do so because existing forces within
their institution divert them away from the first two roles and into an
exclusive--or nearly so--preoccupation with the third.

The development

of ethics committees is one hopeful move in the right direction.

But

unless not only the social structures themselves, but the
presuppositions about persons and their relationships upon which they
rest are reconstructed, most of our ethical thinking in health care
ethics will remain unaffected.
CONCLUDI~G REMARKS

The aim of this dissertation has been to examine critically a
standard approach to the process of identifying, analysing and resolving
problematic cases in the field of health care ethics.

In the course

this examination, certain presuppositions that are central to this
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approach have been identified, and their antecedents and consequents
(i.e., origin, function and implications) explored.

These

presuppositions concern the nature of persons, describing as 'given,' or
essential, attributes that are, in reality, the result of a particular
strain of human development.

The results of this examination suggest

that this set of unreflectively held presuppositions is indicative of a
deeper, uncritically held methodological presupposition: namely, that
there are aspects of experience that can be fixed and captured by
language, conceptualized into principles and then 'applied' in
algorithmic fashion to solve problems.
In this dissertation I have offered an alternative approach to
clinical encounters between patients and care-givers which, while it
does not abandon principles, argues that principles, applied without
understanding the bio/psycho/social dynamics of a particular case can
cause us to miss much that is central to that encounter.

The

alternative approach advocated in this work seeks resolution to
ethically problematic cases through the attempt to understand the
complex interrelationships that have developed between patients and
their entire intellectual, emotional, social and material environment,
including significant others, care-givers, communities and cultures, and
by then devising prospective, as opposed to reactionary, strategies
capable of resolving conflicts that arise in the course of these
interrelationships.

In so doing, this approach denies the validity of

ethical behavior based on the 'application' of either static principles
or individualistic and subjective intuitions.
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My account denies the possibility of understanding either the
individual or community in isolation from one another.

They are not

rigid or static and isolated conceptions, but fluid and dynamic
interrelationships within the organism/environment complex.

The

integrity of each of the parts is, therefore, dependent upon activities
which promote the continued integrity and solidarity of the whole.

This

requires the cooperation of persons in recognizing, communicating, and
respecting each others' bio/psycho/social perspectives as providing a
uniquely necessary element so essential to the intelligent (which
includes ethical) direction and integration of our personal habits and
social customs and institutions.

Endnotes

1Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, For the Patient's
Good:_The Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care (New York: Oxford
University Press), 1988.
2one of the most prominent physicians of the nineteenth century was
Rudolf Virchow, the father of pathology, who campaigned vigorously for
social reforms and, on more than one occasion, annoyed the government of
Germany by criticizing the existing social conditions. In the 1920's,
Margaret Higgins Sanger, a nurse and founder of the birth control
movement in the United States, was harassed, jailed and generally
vilified by the government.
3Nurses Alliance for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Physicians for
Social Responsibility and International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War are three organizations that come immediately to mind.
4This lack might help to explain--though hardly justify--why, for
example, health care providers passively tolerated for nearly twenty
years reports published in some of the most prestigious medical journals
by the United States Public Health Services concerning their Tuskegee
'study,' which consisted of placing over two hundred syphilitic black
men on placebos, allowing them to believe they were being cured, and
purposely trying to thwart their receiving effective treatment from any
other source. It was 1973 before the United States Public Health
Services called an end to this technically- as well as ethically- flawed
study. There are now a number of excellent sources for the history of
this, and other, unconscionable practices that have, at one time or
another, been tolerated under the rubric of medical experimentation.
For Tuskegee, see especially the classic history by James H. Jones, Bad
Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: Free Press), 1981 and
the section featured in The Hastings Center Report, vol. 22, no. 6, NovDec, 1992, pp. 29-40.
5A relatively unique example of the creation of such a forum
devoted to sustained prospective inquiry into a specific, but wideranging ethical issue in health care is the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research. Their publication, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining
Treatment: A Report of the Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in
Treatment Decisions, March, 1983, illustrates the potential fruits of
the creation of such fora. However, one of the main drawbacks of this
commission was a failure to establish or at least encourage mechanisms
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of public dialogue to respond to the commission, which consisted almost
entirely of Ph.D. 's, J.D. 's, M.D. 'sand one or two S.J. 's. The results
of such a commission should mark the beginning of public education,
dialogue and synthesis, and not merely the end of philosophical
analysis.
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